On 2017-11-16 09:06, Qu Wenruo wrote:
On 2017年11月16日 20:33, Zdenek Kabelac wrote:
Dne 16.11.2017 v 11:04 Qu Wenruo napsal(a):
On 2017年11月16日 17:43, Zdenek Kabelac wrote:
Dne 16.11.2017 v 09:08 Qu Wenruo napsal(a):
[What we have]
The nearest infrastructure I found in kernel is
bio_integrity_payload.
Hi
We already have dm-integrity target upstream.
What's missing in this target ?
If I didn't miss anything, the dm-integrity is designed to calculate and
restore csum into its space to verify the integrity.
The csum happens when bio reaches dm-integrity.
However what I want is, fs generate bio with attached verification hook,
and pass to lower layers to verify it.
For example, if we use the following device mapper layout:
FS (can be any fs with metadata csum)
|
dm-integrity
|
dm-raid1
/ \
disk1 disk2
If some data in disk1 get corrupted (the disk itself is still good), and
when dm-raid1 tries to read the corrupted data, it may return the
corrupted one, and then caught by dm-integrity, finally return -EIO to
FS.
But the truth is, we could at least try to read out data in disk2 if we
know the csum for it.
And use the checksum to verify if it's the correct data.
So my idea will be:
FS (with metadata csum, or even data csum support)
| READ bio for metadata
| -With metadata verification hook
dm-raid1
/ \
disk1 disk2
dm-raid1 handles the bio, reading out data from disk1.
But the result can't pass verification hook.
Then retry with disk2.
If result from disk2 passes verification hook. That's good, returning
the result from disk2 to upper layer (fs).
And we can even submit WRITE bio to try to write the good result back to
disk1.
If result from disk2 doesn't pass verification hook, then we return -EIO
to upper layer.
That's what btrfs has already done for DUP/RAID1/10 (although RAID5/6
will also try to rebuild data, but it still has some problem).
I just want to make device-mapper raid able to handle such case too.
Especially when most fs supports checksum for their metadata.
Hi
IMHO you are looking for too complicated solution.
This is at least less complicated than dm-integrity.
Just a new hook for READ bio. And it can start from easy part.
Like starting from dm-raid1 and other fs support.
It's less complicated for end users (in theory, but cryptsetup devs are
working on that for dm-integrity), but significantly more complicated
for developers.
It also brings up the question of what happens when you want some other
layer between the filesystem and the MD/DM RAID layer (say, running
bcache or dm-cache on top of the RAID array). In the case of
dm-integrity, that's not an issue because dm-integrity is entirely
self-contained, it doesn't depend on other layers beyond the standard
block interface.
As I mentioned in my other reply on this thread, running with
dm-integrity _below_ the RAID layer instead of on top of it will provide
the same net effect, and in fact provide a stronger guarantee than what
you are proposing (because dm-integrity does real cryptographic
integrity verification, as opposed to just checking for bit-rot).
If your checksum is calculated and checked at FS level there is no added
value when you spread this logic to other layers.
That's why I'm moving the checking part to lower level, to make more
value from the checksum.
dm-integrity adds basic 'check-summing' to any filesystem without the
need to modify fs itself
Well, despite the fact that modern filesystem has already implemented
their metadata csum.
- the paid price is - if there is bug between
passing data from 'fs' to dm-integrity' it cannot be captured.
Advantage of having separated 'fs' and 'block' layer is in its
separation and simplicity at each level.
Totally agreed on this.
But the idea here should not bring that large impact (compared to big
things like ZFS/Btrfs).
1) It only affect READ bio
2) Every dm target can choose if to support or pass down the hook.
no mean to support it for RAID0 for example.
And for complex raid like RAID5/6 no need to support it from the very
beginning.
3) Main part of the functionality is already implemented
The core complexity contains 2 parts:
a) checksum calculation and checking
Modern fs is already doing this, at least for metadata.
b) recovery
dm targets already have this implemented for supported raid
profile.
All these are already implemented, just moving them to different
timing is not bringing such big modification IIRC.
If you want integrated solution - you are simply looking for btrfs where
multiple layers are integrated together.
If with such verification hook (along with something extra to handle
scrub), btrfs chunk mapping can be re-implemented with device-mapper:
In fact btrfs logical space is just a dm-linear device, and each chunk
can be implemented by its corresponding dm-* module like:
dm-linear: | btrfs chunk 1 | btrfs chunk 2 | ... | btrfs chunk n |
and
btrfs chunk 1: metadata, using dm-raid1 on diskA and diskB
btrfs chunk 2: data, using dm-raid0 on disk A B C D
...
btrfs chunk n: system, using dm-raid1 on disk A B
At least btrfs can take the advantage of the simplicity of separate layers.
And other filesystem can get a little higher chance to recover its
metadata if built on dm-raid.
Again, just put dm-integrity below dm-raid. The other filesystems
primarily have metadata checksums to catch data corruption, not repair
it, and I severely doubt that you will manage to convince developers to
add support in their filesystem (especially XFS) because:
1. It's a layering violation (yes, I know BTRFS is too, but that's a bit
less of an issue because it's a completely self-contained layering
violation, while this isn't).
2. There's no precedent in hardware (I challenge you to find a block
device that lets you respond to a read completing with 'Hey, this data
is bogus, give me the real data!').
3. You can get the same net effect with a higher guarantee of security
using dm-integrity.
Thanks,
Qu
You are also possibly missing feature of dm-interity - it's not just
giving you 'checksum' - it also makes you sure - device has proper
content - you can't just 'replace block' even with proper checksum for a
block somewhere in the middle of you device... and when joined with
crypto - it makes it way more secure...
Regards
Zdenek