These checks are meant to prevent leaks or attacks via directory
traversal, the use of CAP_SYS_ADMIN here is a misuse,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH being way more appropriate as a process
with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is entrusted with going trough all directories.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not meant to flag such a process.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/dcookies.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/dcookies.c b/fs/dcookies.c
index 0d0461cf2431..48491299a183 100644
--- a/fs/dcookies.c
+++ b/fs/dcookies.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lookup_dcookie, u64, cookie64, char __user *, buf, size_t, len)
/* we could leak path information to users
* without dir read permission without this
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return -EPERM;
mutex_lock(&dcookie_mutex);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ad3b0762cc3e..965a3aa1a77f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2006,16 +2006,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
};
/*
- * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
- * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
- * path to the file in question.
+ * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to follow the links, due
+ * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
+ * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
*/
static const char *
proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done);
--
2.14.2
