On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 05:37:53PM +0200, Philipp Guendisch wrote:
> This patch adds a software based secure erase option to improve data
> confidentiality. The CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SECURE_ERASE option enables a mount
> flag called 'sw_secure_erase'. When you mount a volume with this flag,
> every discard call is prepended by an explicit write command to overwrite
> the data before it is discarded. A volume without a discard compatibility
> can be used as well but the discard calls will be enabled for this device
> and suppressed after the write call is made.
How can this work with CoW filesystems?
>
> Built against torvalds/linux
This should go below the '---' so git am doesn't write it into the changelog.
[...]
> + if (strcmp(fs_type->name, "ext4") != 0 &&
> + strcmp(fs_type->name, "btrfs") != 0 &&
> + strcmp(fs_type->name, "gfs2") != 0 &&
> + strcmp(fs_type->name, "gfs2meta") != 0 &&
> + strcmp(fs_type->name, "xfs") != 0 &&
> + strcmp(fs_type->name, "jfs") != 0) {
> + pr_warn("fs: The mounted %s filesystem on drive %s does not generate discards, secure erase won't work",
> + fs_type->name, dev_name);
> + }
> +skip:
> +#endif
Which filesystems commonly used in production are left afterwards?
I'm sorry, but while I get that this sounds like a nice feature for a paper or
reasearch project, I don't see why it should be used on production systems at
all.
Byte,
Johannes
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