On 8/9/2017 4:30 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Wed, 2017-08-09 at 11:15 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
On 8/2/2017 9:22 AM, James Morris wrote:
On Tue, 1 Aug 2017, Roberto Sassu wrote:
On 8/1/2017 12:27 PM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
On Tue, Aug 01, 2017 at 12:20:36PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
This patch introduces a parser for RPM packages. It extracts the digests
from the RPMTAG_FILEDIGESTS header section and converts them to binary
data
before adding them to the hash table.
The advantage of this data type is that verifiers can determine who
produced that data, as headers are signed by Linux distributions vendors.
RPM headers signatures can be provided as digest list metadata.
Err, parsing arbitrary file formats has no business in the kernel.
The benefit of this choice is that no actions are required for
Linux distribution vendors to support the solution I'm proposing,
because they already provide signed digest lists (RPM headers).
Since the proof of loading a digest list is the digest of the
digest list (included in the list metadata), if RPM headers are
converted to a different format, remote attestation verifiers
cannot check the signature.
If the concern is security, it would be possible to prevent unsigned
RPM headers from being parsed, if the PGP key type is upstreamed
(adding in CC keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx).
It's a security concern and also a layering violation, there should be no
need to parse package file formats in the kernel.
Parsing RPMs is not strictly necessary. Digests from the headers
can be extracted and written to a new file using the compact data
format (introduced with patch 7/12).
At boot time, IMA measures this file before digests are uploaded to the
kernel. At this point, only files with unknown digest will be added
to the measurement list. At verification time, verifiers recreate the
measurement list by merging together the digests uploaded to the
kernel with the unknown digests. Then, they verify the obtained list.
There are two ways to verify the digests: searching them in a reference
database, or checking a signature. With the 'ima-sig' measurement list
template, it is possible to verify signatures for each accessed file.
With this patch set, it is possible to verify the signature of
the file containing the digests uploaded to the kernel. If the data
format changes, the signature cannot be verified.
To avoid this limitation, the parsers could be moved to a userspace
tool which then uploads the parsed digests to the kernel. IMA would
measure the original files. But, if the tool is compromised, it could
load digests not included in the parsed files. With the current solution
this problem does not arise because no changes can be done by userspace
applications to the uploaded data while digests are parsed by IMA.
I could remove the RPM parser from the patch set for now.
Is the remaining part of the patch set ok, and is the explanation of
what it does clear?
From a trusted boot perspective, file measurements are added to the
measurement list, before access to the file is given. The measurement
list contains ALL measurements, as defined by policy. This patch set
changes that meaning to be all measurements, as defined by policy,
with the exception of those in a white list.
The digest list is also measured, so the measurement list is complete.
Verifiers have to check the digest of digest lists. Otherwise, they
would get an unknown digest and conclude that the system being verified
has been compromised.
If you prefer, I could add a new policy rule option to avoid file
measurements if the digest is in the digest list.
Changing the fundamental meaning of the measurement list is not
acceptable. You could define a new securityfs file to differentiate
between the full measurement list and this abbreviated one. But
There cannot be two measurement lists at the same time. Providing the
full measurement list (containing the digest of files being accessed)
implies that its integrity must be protected with PCR extends, making
the optimization done by this patch set useless.
before making this sort of change, I would prefer to address the
underlying problem - TPM peformance.
Even if the TPM driver performance improves significantly (17 seconds
for 1000 extends), the boot time delay would be still noticeable
(8.5 seconds for normal boot + 24 seconds for 1400 PCR extends).
In my opinion, this patch set is useful without considering the
performance improvement: reduced size of measurement lists and
verification of digest list signatures, instead of file signatures,
where signatures are already provided by Linux distributions.
There are a couple of things that could be done to improve the TPM
driver performance, itself. Once all of these options have been
pursued, we could then consider batching the measurements to the TPM,
meaning that the measurement list would still contain all the file
measurements, but instead of extending the TPM for each measurement, a
batched hash - a hash of a group of file measurements - would be
extended into the TPM.
Probably, I didn't explain clearly that this patch set does not decrease
the security of IMA.
Extending the PCR for a group of file measurements means that the system
can be compromised between two PCR extends without detection because
a malicious binary could alter IMA before the next extend.
This patch set extends the PCR with the digest of digest lists, before
files are accessed. No actions happen before either the digest lists
have been measured or the file measurement is added to the measurement
list, if the file digest is not included in the digest list.
Roberto
Mimi
I'm not really clear on exactly how this patch series works. Can you
provide a more concrete explanation of what steps would occur during boot
and attestation?
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