Hi all
I sent this patch two months ago, then I found CVE from this link last night
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q3/240
which not only references this patch, but also provides a upstream fix
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9
I was wondering why @viro hadn't noticed this mail (And @viro fixed
this). I'm new here and nobody,
trying to do my best to help the this linux community. I was looking
forword to your reply, because some
insufficiency may exists in my work, I'd like to learn from you guys
Thanks and humble enough to wait your reply
在 2017年5月31日 上午11:54，石祤 <linxiulei@xxxxxxxxx> 写道：
> From: "leilei.lin" <leilei.lin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Kernel got panicked in inotify_handle_event, while running the rename
> operation against the same file. The root cause is that the race between
> fsnotify thread and file rename thread. When fsnotify thread was
> copying the dentry name, another rename thread could change the dentry
> name at same time. With slub_debug=FZ boot args, this bug will trigger
> a trace like the following:
>
> [ 87.733653] =============================================================================
> [ 87.735350] BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
> [ 87.736550] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> [ 87.738466] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
> [ 87.739556] INFO: 0xffff8e487a50b0f8-0xffff8e487a50b0fc. First byte 0x33 instead of 0xcc
> [ 87.741188] INFO: Slab 0xfffff116c0e942c0 objects=46 used=43 fp=0xffff8e487a50bf80 flags=0xffff8000000101
> [ 87.743133] INFO: Object 0xffff8e487a50b0b8 @offset=184 fp=0xffff8e487a50b0b8
>
> [ 87.744942] Redzone ffff8e487a50b0b0: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
> [ 87.746743] Object ffff8e487a50b0b8: b8 b0 50 7a 48 8e ff ff b8 b0 50 7a 48 8e ff ff ..PzH.....PzH...
> [ 87.748621] Object ffff8e487a50b0c8: 60 75 7e 7b 48 8e ff ff 08 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 `u~{H...........
> [ 87.750583] Object ffff8e487a50b0d8: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 74 64 63 5f ............tdc_
> [ 87.752541] Object ffff8e487a50b0e8: 61 64 6d 69 6e 2e 4c 4f 47 2e 31 31 32 33 31 32 admin.LOG.112312
> [ 87.754431] Redzone ffff8e487a50b0f8: 33 31 32 33 00 cc cc cc 3123....
> [ 87.756172] Padding ffff8e487a50b100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
> [ 87.757988] CPU: 0 PID: 286 Comm: python Tainted: G B 4.11.0-rc4+ #29
> [ 87.759574] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.1-0-gb3ef39f-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> [ 87.761878] Call Trace:
> [ 87.762381] dump_stack+0x65/0x88
> [ 87.763063] print_trailer+0x15d/0x250
> [ 87.763833] check_bytes_and_report+0xcd/0x110
> [ 87.764731] check_object+0x1ce/0x290
> [ 87.765472] free_debug_processing+0x9c/0x2e3
> [ 87.766362] ? inotify_free_event+0xe/0x10
> [ 87.767191] __slab_free+0x1ba/0x2b0
> [ 87.767922] ? async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
> [ 87.768731] ? inotify_free_event+0xe/0x10
> [ 87.769558] kfree+0x165/0x1a0
> [ 87.770184] inotify_free_event+0xe/0x10
> [ 87.770974] fsnotify_destroy_event+0x51/0x70
> [ 87.771851] inotify_read+0x1dc/0x3a0
> [ 87.772582] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0
> [ 87.773388] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
> [ 87.774078] ? security_file_permission+0x9d/0xc0
> [ 87.775009] vfs_read+0x8c/0x130
> [ 87.775657] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
> [ 87.776328] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
> [ 87.777280] RIP: 0033:0x7fcc1375b210
> [ 87.778001] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2f00b838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
> [ 87.779513] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcc1303d7b8 RCX: 00007fcc1375b210
> [ 87.780932] RDX: 0000000000005c70 RSI: 00000000013fe9f4 RDI: 0000000000000004
> [ 87.782337] RBP: 00007fcc1303d760 R08: 0000000000000080 R09: 0000000000005c95
> [ 87.783780] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000005c95
> [ 87.785203] R13: 0000000000002708 R14: 0000000000005ca1 R15: 00007fcc1303d7b8
> [ 87.786636] FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring 0xffff8e487a50b0f8-0xffff8e487a50b0fc=0xcc
>
> [ 87.789388] FIX kmalloc-64: Object at 0xffff8e487a50b0b8 not freed
>
> Graph below is the flow of inotify subsystem handling
> notify event. If a rename syscall happened simultaneously,
> for example filename of "foobar" is rename to
> "foobar_longername", which would access memory illegally.
>
> CPU 1 CPU 2
>
> fsnotify()
> inotify_handle_event()
> strlen(file_name) // file_name -> "foobar"
>
> rename happen
> file_name -> "foobar_longername"
>
> alloc_len += len + 1;
> event = kmalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> strcpy(event->name, file_name); -> overwritten
>
> Signed-off-by: leilei.lin <leilei.lin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/notify/fsnotify.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/notify/fsnotify.c b/fs/notify/fsnotify.c
> index b41515d..2c6f94d 100644
> --- a/fs/notify/fsnotify.c
> +++ b/fs/notify/fsnotify.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ int __fsnotify_parent(const struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, __u32 mask
> struct dentry *parent;
> struct inode *p_inode;
> int ret = 0;
> + char *name = NULL;
>
> if (!dentry)
> dentry = path->dentry;
> @@ -108,14 +109,23 @@ int __fsnotify_parent(const struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, __u32 mask
> * specifies these are events which came from a child. */
> mask |= FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
>
> + ret = copy_dname(dentry, &name);
> +
> + if (ret) {
> + dput(parent);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> if (path)
> ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH,
> - dentry->d_name.name, 0);
> + name, 0);
> else
> ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, dentry->d_inode, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE,
> - dentry->d_name.name, 0);
> + name, 0);
> }
>
> + kfree(name);
> +
> dput(parent);
>
> return ret;
> --
> 2.8.4.31.g9ed660f
>
