Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > Hello. > > Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > CAP_MKNOD will be removed from its capability > I think it is not enough because the root can rename/unlink device files > (mv /dev/sda1 /dev/tmp; mv /dev/sda2 /dev/sda1; mv /dev/tmp /dev/sda2). Sure but that doesn't bother us :) The admin in the container has his own /dev directory and can do what he likes with the devices he's allowed to have. He just shouldn't have access to others. If he wants to rename /dev/sda1 to /dev/sda5 that's his choice. > > To use your approach, i guess we would have to use selinux (or tomoyo) > > to enforce that devices may only be created under /dev? > Everyone can use this filesystem alone. Sure but it is worthless alone. No? What will keep the container admin from doing 'mknod /root/hda1 b 3 1'? > But use with MAC (or whatever access control mechanisms that prevent > attackers from unmounting/overlaying this filesystem) is recomennded. -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
