On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 3:25 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
> that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
> be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
> result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
> have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
> new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
> cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
> privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
> bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
>
> Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
> from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
> moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
> removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
> since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
> "elevated privileges" calculation.
>
> The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
> since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
with the redundant caveat that...
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1330,6 +1330,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
>
> void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
> {
> + /*
> + * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so
> + * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the
> + * secureexec flag.
> + */
> + bprm->secureexec |= bprm->cap_elevated;
> +
...the weird placement of the other assignments to bprm->secureexec
makes this exceedingly confusing.
