From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
The IMA assessment code tries to use the i_version counter to detect
when changes to a file have occurred. Many filesystems don't increment
it properly (or at all) so detecting changes with that is not always
reliable.
That check should be gated on IS_I_VERSION, as you can't rely on the
i_version field changing unless that returns true.
Have the code also track and check the mtime for the file. If the
IS_I_VERSION returns false, then use it to detect whether the file's
contents might have changed.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
v2: switch to storing/checking mtime instead of ctime
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c2edba8de35e..b8d746bbc43d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
} hash;
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
- u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ u64 i_version = inode->i_version;
+ struct timespec i_mtime = inode->i_mtime;
if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
iint->version = i_version;
+ iint->mtime = i_mtime;
iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
} else
result = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2aebb7984437..8d12ef2d3ba2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -113,6 +113,25 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
}
+static bool ima_should_update_iint(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) != 1)
+ return false;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)
+ return true;
+ if (IS_I_VERSION(inode)) {
+ if (iint->version != inode->i_version)
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ if (iint->mtime.tv_sec != inode->i_mtime.tv_sec)
+ return true;
+ if (iint->mtime.tv_nsec != inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
@@ -122,14 +141,11 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
inode_lock(inode);
- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
- if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
- (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
- iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
- iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
- if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
- ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
- }
+ if (ima_should_update_iint(iint, inode)) {
+ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
}
inode_unlock(inode);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index a53e7e4ab06c..61fffa7583bf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
+ struct timespec mtime; /* track inode changes */
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long measured_pcrs;
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
--
2.13.0
