On Sunday, July 24, 2016 4:25:16 PM CEST Nicolas Pitre wrote:
> On Sun, 24 Jul 2016, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
>
> > On Sunday, July 24, 2016 11:30:26 AM CEST Nicolas Pitre wrote:
> > > +#else
> > > + /*
> > > + * This is used on MMU systems mainly for testing.
> > > + * Let's use a kernel buffer to simplify things.
> > > + */
> > > + long unz_text_len = text_len - sizeof(struct flat_hdr);
> > > + long unz_len = unz_text_len + full_data;
> > > + char *unz_data = vmalloc(unz_len);
> > > + if (!unz_data) {
> > > + result = -ENOMEM;
> > >
> >
> > Is there a risk of a malicious user exhausting vmalloc space with a
> > binary that has forged headers? If there is, maybe put an upper bound on
> > the size of allocation.
>
> Patch #3 enforces a cap on all parameters to avoid overflows and
> unreasonable section sizes.
>
> Then vmalloc space is used here only for decompressing the binary into,
> after which the whole thing is copied to user space and the vmalloc area
> is freed right away.
>
> > More broadly speaking, are there any other attacks that may get enabled
> > through forged binaries? We've had a couple of vulnerabilities in
> > binfmt_elf over the years, and I wonder how dangerous it might be
> > if distros turn on binfmt_flat support by default.
>
> That was Alan's concern too which prompted patch #3. But with a clamp on
> all parameters, everything else is done via user accessors. So an
> executable still can crap onto itself or generate a segfault but I doubt
> we really care at that point.
>
Ok, sounds good.
Arnd
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
