Hi,
2007/5/24, James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>:
I can restate my question and ask why you'd want a security policy like:
Subject 'sysadmin' has:
read access to /etc/shadow
read/write access to /views/sysadmin/etc/shadow
where the objects referenced by the paths are identical and visible to the
subject along both paths, in keeping with your description of "policy may
allow access to some locations but not to others" ?
If I understand correctly, the original issue was whether to allow passing
vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook or not. Which is independent from
AA or "pathname based MAC", I think.
It is proven that Linux can be used without that change, however it is
also clear that current LSM cause the ambiguities as AA people has
explained. Clearing ambiguities is a obvious gain to Linux and will make
benefits for auditing besides "pathname based MAC".
So here's my opinion. If anybody can't explain clear reason (or needs)
to keep these ambiguities unsolved, we should consider to merge
the proposal.
Thanks.
--
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@xxxxxxxxx
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