On Thursday 24 May 2007 03:28, James Morris wrote: > On Wed, 23 May 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > > This is backwards from what AppArmor does. The policy defines which paths > > may be accessed; all paths not explicitly listed are denied. If files are > > mounted at multiple locations, then the policy may allow access to some > > locations but not to others. That's not a hole. > > I don't know what else you'd call it. AppArmor doesn't label files; it's a different model from SELinux. Its policy defines which processes may access which paths. Even if for some reson the same files were visible elsewhere, the policy wouldn't cover those other paths, and so accessing them would be denied. So again, that's not a security hole. > Would you mind providing some concrete examples of how such a model would > be useful? The model is explained, with examples, in the technical documentation at http://forgeftp.novell.com//apparmor/LKML_Submission-May_07/. Thanks, Andreas - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
