Quoting Andreas Dilger (adilger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx): > On May 08, 2007 14:17 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > As the capability set changes and distributions start tagging > > binaries with capabilities, we would like for running an older > > kernel to not necessarily make those binaries unusable. > > > > (0. Enable the CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES option > > when CONFIG_SECURITY=n.) > > (1. Rename CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES to > > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES) > > 2. Introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES_STRICTXATTR > > which, when set, prevents loading binaries with capabilities > > set which the kernel doesn't know about. When not set, > > such capabilities run, ignoring the unknown caps. > > 3. To accomodate 64-bit caps, specify that capabilities are > > stored as > > u32 version; u32 eff0; u32 perm0; u32 inh0; > > u32 eff1; u32 perm1; u32 inh1; (etc) > > Have you considered how such capabilities will be used in the future? There have been all sorts of suggestions, including very fine-grained breakdowns of existing capabilities as well as capabilities for non-privileged operations. Other candidates for upcoming capabilities will be to satisfy containers/vserver/openvz, where a distinction needs to be made between CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE inside the user namespace, and the global CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. Although the path i've been pursuing (for which I should really send out the prelim patches I've been sitting on) follow David Howell's and Eric Biederman's suggestions of using the keyrings to store capabilities to other user namespaces. Still new capabilities may be desirable to guard CLONE_NEW_NS etc (rather than CAP_SYS_ADMIN). > One of the important use cases I can see today is the ability to > split the heavily-overloaded e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN into much more fine > grained attributes. Sounds plausible, though it suffers from both making capabilities far more cumbersome (i.e. finding the right capability for what you wanted to do) and backward compatibility. Perhaps at that point we should introduce security.capabilityv2 xattrs. A binary can then carry security.capability=CAP_SYS_ADMIN=p, and security.capabilityv2=cap_may_clone_mntns=p. > What we definitely do NOT want to happen is an application that needs > priviledged access (e.g. e2fsck, mount) to stop running because the > new capabilities _would_ have been granted by the new kernel and are > not by the old kernel and STRICTXATTR is used. > > To me it would seem that having extra capabilities on an old kernel > is relatively harmless if the old kernel doesn't know what they are. > It's like having a key to a door that you don't know where it is. If we ditch the STRICTXATTR option do the semantics seem sane to you? thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
