From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxx> Define a new fs flag FS_SAFE, which denotes, that unprivileged mounting of this filesystem may not constitute a security problem. Since most filesystems haven't been designed with unprivileged mounting in mind, a thorough audit is needed before setting this flag. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxx> --- Index: linux/fs/namespace.c =================================================================== --- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-20 11:55:10.000000000 +0200 +++ linux/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-20 11:55:13.000000000 +0200 @@ -781,13 +781,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use * - mountpoint is not a symlink or special file * - mountpoint is in a mount owned by the user */ -static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags) +static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, struct file_system_type *type, + int *flags) { struct inode *inode = nd->dentry->d_inode; if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return true; + if (type && !(type->fs_flags & FS_SAFE)) + return false; + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return false; @@ -1021,7 +1025,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL; int err; - if (!permit_mount(nd, &flags)) + if (!permit_mount(nd, NULL, &flags)) return -EPERM; if (!old_name || !*old_name) return -EINVAL; @@ -1182,26 +1186,46 @@ out: * create a new mount for userspace and request it to be added into the * namespace's tree */ -static int do_new_mount(struct nameidata *nd, char *type, int flags, +static int do_new_mount(struct nameidata *nd, char *fstype, int flags, int mnt_flags, char *name, void *data) { + int err; struct vfsmount *mnt; + struct file_system_type *type; - if (!type || !memchr(type, 0, PAGE_SIZE)) + if (!fstype || !memchr(fstype, 0, PAGE_SIZE)) return -EINVAL; - /* we need capabilities... */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - mnt = do_kern_mount(type, flags & ~MS_SETUSER, name, data); - if (IS_ERR(mnt)) + type = get_fs_type(fstype); + if (!type) + return -ENODEV; + + err = -EPERM; + if (!permit_mount(nd, type, &flags)) + goto out_put_filesystem; + + if (flags & MS_SETUSER) { + err = reserve_user_mount(); + if (err) + goto out_put_filesystem; + } + + mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, flags & ~MS_SETUSER, name, data); + put_filesystem(type); + if (IS_ERR(mnt)) { + if (flags & MS_SETUSER) + dec_nr_user_mounts(); return PTR_ERR(mnt); + } if (flags & MS_SETUSER) - set_mnt_user(mnt); + __set_mnt_user(mnt); return do_add_mount(mnt, nd, mnt_flags, NULL); + + out_put_filesystem: + put_filesystem(type); + return err; } /* @@ -1231,7 +1255,7 @@ int do_add_mount(struct vfsmount *newmnt if (S_ISLNK(newmnt->mnt_root->d_inode->i_mode)) goto unlock; - /* MNT_USER was set earlier */ + /* some flags may have been set earlier */ newmnt->mnt_flags |= mnt_flags; if ((err = graft_tree(newmnt, nd))) goto unlock; Index: linux/include/linux/fs.h =================================================================== --- linux.orig/include/linux/fs.h 2007-04-20 11:55:11.000000000 +0200 +++ linux/include/linux/fs.h 2007-04-20 11:55:13.000000000 +0200 @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ extern int dir_notify_enable; #define FS_REQUIRES_DEV 1 #define FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA 2 #define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE 4 +#define FS_SAFE 8 /* Safe to mount by unprivileged users */ #define FS_REVAL_DOT 16384 /* Check the paths ".", ".." for staleness */ #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move() * during rename() internally. -- - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html