On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 15:55 -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote: > Karl MacMillan wrote: > > On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote: > > > >> On Mon, 16 Apr 2007, John Johansen wrote: > >> > >>> Label-based security (exemplified by SELinux, and its predecessors in > >>> MLS systems) attaches security policy to the data. As the data flows > >>> through the system, the label sticks to the data, and so security > >>> policy with respect to this data stays intact. This is a good approach > >>> for ensuring secrecy, the kind of problem that intelligence agencies have. > >>> > >> Labels are also a good approach for ensuring integrity, which is one of > >> the most fundamental aspects of the security model implemented by SELinux. > >> > >> Some may infer otherwise from your document. > >> > > Not only that, the implication that secrecy is only useful to > > intelligence agencies is pretty funny. > That was not the claim. It might not have been the claim, but I certainly think it was the implication. > Rather, that intelligence agencies have a very > strong need for privacy, and will go to greater lengths to get it, > including using MLS systems. I contend that while most organizations > want privacy, they don't want it so badly that they will put up with > MLS, and so are looking for a more tolerable form of security. > Definitely - which is why SELinux is primarily about type enforcement. > This is relevant here because information flow is the main advantage of > labels over pathnames for access control. I would say that controlling information flow is _one_ of the main advantages of labels. There are others. > AppArmor does not attempt to > manage information flow, allowing it to use pathnames to achieve ease of > use. If you want information flow control, then by all means use a > label-based system. > You're trying to force a false choice between "ease of use" and "information flow control". These AppArmor / SELinux debates are irritating enough without these kinds of misleading rhetorical techniques. Karl - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
