On Fri, 2007-04-13 at 16:05 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > > > Thinking a bit more about this, I'm quite sure most users wouldn't > > > even want private namespaces. It would be enough to > > > > > > chroot /share/$USER > > > > > > and be done with it. > > > > > > Private namespaces are only good for keeping a bunch of mounts > > > referenced by a group of processes. But my guess is, that the natural > > > behavior for users is to see a persistent set of mounts. > > > > > > If for example they mount something on a remote machine, then log out > > > from the ssh session and later log back in, they would want to see > > > their previous mount still there. > > > > > > Miklos > > > > Agreed on desired behavior, but not on chroot sufficing. It actually > > sounds like you want exactly what was outlined in the OLS paper. > > > > Users still need to be in a different mounts namespace from the admin > > user so long as we consider the deluser and backup problems > > I don't think it matters, because /share/$USER duplicates a part or > the whole of the user's namespace. > > So backup would have to be taught about /share anyway, and deluser > operates on /home/$USER and not on /share/*, so there shouldn't be any > problem. > > There's actually very little difference between rbind+chroot, and > CLONE_NEWNS. In a private namespace: > > 1) when no more processes reference the namespace, the tree will be > disbanded > > 2) the mount tree won't be accessible from outside the namespace > > Wanting a persistent namespace contradicts 1). > > Wanting a per-user (as opposed to per-session) namespace contradicts > 2). The namespace _has_ to be accessible from outside, so that a new > session can access/copy it. As i mentioned in the previous mail, disbanding all the namespaces of a user will not disband his mount tree, because a mirror of the mount tree still continues to exist in /share/$USER in the admin namespace. And a new user session can always use this copy to create a namespace that looks identical to that which existed earlier. > > So both requirements point to the rbind/chroot solution. Arn't there ways to escape chroot jails? Serge had pointed me to a URL which showed chroots can be escaped. And if that is true than having all user's private mount tree in the same namespace can be a security issue? RP > > Miklos - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
