Hi! > AppArmor's Overall Design > ========================= > > AppArmor protects systems from vulnerable software by confining > processes, giving them "least privilege" access to the system's > resources: with least privilege, processes are allowed exactly what they > need, nothing more, and nothing less. Systems are thus protected from > bugs in applications that would lead to privilege escalation, such as > remote system access because of a buffer overflow in a web server, etc. > > AppArmor does this by defining application profiles which list allowed > accesses, and assigning those profiles to processes. AppArmor does *not* You can do the same with ptrace. If that's not fast enough... improve ptrace? > The corollary to this is that attacks against AppArmor that start with > "assume some unconfined process does ..." are outside the AppArmor > threat model. Any process that might do something malicious to an IOW AppArmor is broken by design. (One reason is: operations by unconfined processes that did not use to be security sensitive before -- ln shadow random_name -- are security sensitive now.) Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
