Re: [patch 0/8] unprivileged mount syscall

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> > One thing that is missing from this series is the ability to restrict
> > user mounts to private namespaces.  The reason is that private
> > namespaces have still not gained the momentum and support needed for
> > painless user experience.  So such a feature would not yet get enough
> > attention and testing.  However adding such an optional restriction
> > can be done with minimal changes in the future, once private
> > namespaces have matured.
> 
> What is the main reason for that feature?  Would it be to prevent things
> like login from being tricked by user mounts?  Isn't it sufficient, in
> fact, better, to require that the target of the mount be owned by the
> user doing the mount?

It's been discussed later in that thread.  Basically you can fool a
lot of system programs (like backup) with mounting/binding in the
global namespace.  Restricting the destination doesn't always help.

Miklos
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