In preparation for adding extent infos, split up the existing
fscrypt_info structure into a fscrypt_common_info structure which tracks
the information needed for data encryption and for freeing itself, and a
fscrypt_info structure containing a fscrypt_common_info and the parts only needed for inodes.
All external users continue to use a fscrypt_info, and most functions
don't need to deal with inode-specific parts so they use fscrypt_common_infos.
Similarly, split up the creation and freeing paths to have common parts that deal
with fscrypt_common_infos, and inode-specific parts dealing in
fscrypt_infos.
Alternately, the common struct could be a fscrypt_info, and only the
internal parts that need to deal in a specialized one could cast to the
enclosing specialized type; however, this seems to be less typesafe.
---
fs/crypto/crypto.c | 32 ++--
fs/crypto/fname.c | 13 +-
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 122 +++++++++------
fs/crypto/hooks.c | 6 +-
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 62 ++++----
fs/crypto/keyring.c | 40 ++---
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 296 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 74 ++++-----
fs/crypto/policy.c | 13 +-
9 files changed, 371 insertions(+), 287 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index d75f1b3f5795..d5c9326a1919 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
- * This contains encryption functions for per-file encryption.
+ * This contains encryption functions for fscrypt encryption.
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static mempool_t *fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL;
static struct workqueue_struct *fscrypt_read_workqueue;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_init_mutex);
-struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep;
+struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_inode_info_cachep;
void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page);
/*
- * Generate the IV for the given logical block number within the given file.
+ * Generate the IV for the given logical block number within the given info.
* For filenames encryption, lblk_num == 0.
*
* Keep this in sync with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(). fscrypt_limit_io_blocks()
@@ -78,21 +78,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page);
* simply contain the lblk_num (e.g., IV_INO_LBLK_32).
*/
void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- u8 flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
+ u8 flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&cci->ci_policy);
- memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
+ memset(iv, 0, cci->ci_mode->ivsize);
if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(lblk_num > U32_MAX);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->ci_inode->i_ino > U32_MAX);
- lblk_num |= (u64)ci->ci_inode->i_ino << 32;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cci->ci_inode->i_ino > U32_MAX);
+ lblk_num |= (u64)cci->ci_inode->i_ino << 32;
} else if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(lblk_num > U32_MAX);
- lblk_num = (u32)(ci->ci_hashed_ino + lblk_num);
+ lblk_num = (u32)(cci->ci_hashed_ino + lblk_num);
} else if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
- memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(iv->nonce, cci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
}
iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
}
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ int fscrypt_crypt_block(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist dst, src;
u64 ci_offset = 0;
- struct fscrypt_info *ci =
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci =
fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, lblk_num, &ci_offset, NULL);
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = cci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
int res = 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0))
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int fscrypt_crypt_block(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT != 0))
return -EINVAL;
- fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, cci);
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, gfp_flags);
if (!req)
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
if (!fscrypt_read_workqueue)
goto fail;
- fscrypt_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
- if (!fscrypt_info_cachep)
+ fscrypt_inode_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!fscrypt_inode_info_cachep)
goto fail_free_queue;
err = fscrypt_init_keyring();
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
return 0;
fail_free_info:
- kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_inode_info_cachep);
fail_free_queue:
destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
fail:
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index edb78cd1b0e7..ae20a886dbdf 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ int fscrypt_fname_encrypt(const struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
const struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci = &ci->info;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = cci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
union fscrypt_iv iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
int res;
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_encrypt(const struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
memset(out + iname->len, 0, olen - iname->len);
/* Initialize the IV */
- fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, ci);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, cci);
/* Set up the encryption request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -158,7 +159,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
const struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci = &ci->info;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = cci->ci_enc_key->tfm;
union fscrypt_iv iv;
int res;
@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
/* Initialize IV */
- fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, ci);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, cci);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
@@ -299,7 +301,8 @@ bool __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len,
u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret)
{
- return __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(&inode->i_crypt_info->ci_policy,
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci = &inode->i_crypt_info->info;
+ return __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(&cci->ci_policy,
orig_len, max_len,
encrypted_len_ret);
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 8a1fd1d33cfc..cc1a61ade2a4 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -53,14 +53,15 @@ struct fscrypt_context_v2 {
};
/*
- * fscrypt_context - the encryption context of an inode
+ * fscrypt_context - the encryption context of an object
*
* This is the on-disk equivalent of an fscrypt_policy, stored alongside each
- * encrypted file usually in a hidden extended attribute. It contains the
- * fields from the fscrypt_policy, in order to identify the encryption algorithm
- * and key with which the file is encrypted. It also contains a nonce that was
- * randomly generated by fscrypt itself; this is used as KDF input or as a tweak
- * to cause different files to be encrypted differently.
+ * encrypted object, usually in a hidden extended attribute for a file. It
+ * contains the fields from the fscrypt_policy, in order to identify the
+ * encryption algorithm and key with which the file is encrypted. It also
+ * contains a nonce that was randomly generated by fscrypt itself; this is used
+ * as KDF input or as a tweak to cause different objects to be encrypted
+ * differently.
*/
union fscrypt_context {
u8 version;
@@ -209,32 +210,41 @@ struct fscrypt_prepared_key {
enum fscrypt_prepared_key_type type;
};
+typedef enum {
+ CI_INODE = 1,
+ CI_EXTENT,
+} __packed fscrypt_ci_type_t;
+
/*
- * fscrypt_info - the "encryption key" for an inode
+ * fscrypt_common_info -- shared objects needed for data encryption
*
- * When an encrypted file's key is made available, an instance of this struct is
- * allocated and stored in ->i_crypt_info. Once created, it remains until the
- * inode is evicted.
+ * This keeps track of the information needed to actually encrypt/decrypt data
+ * (the prepared key, nonce, inode, policy, superblock) and the master key
+ * information needed to free this info.
*/
-struct fscrypt_info {
+struct fscrypt_common_info {
/* The key in a form prepared for actual encryption/decryption */
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *ci_enc_key;
- /* True if ci_enc_key should be freed when this fscrypt_info is freed */
+ /*
+ * True if ci_enc_key should be freed when this fscrypt_common_info is
+ * freed.
+ */
bool ci_owns_key;
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
/*
- * True if this inode will use inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of
+ * True if this info will use inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of
* the traditional filesystem-layer encryption.
*/
bool ci_inlinecrypt;
#endif
+ fscrypt_ci_type_t ci_type;
/*
- * Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either the
- * contents or filenames encryption mode, depending on the inode type.
+ * Encryption mode used for this info. It corresponds to either the
+ * contents or filenames encryption mode, depending on the info.
*/
struct fscrypt_mode *ci_mode;
@@ -242,18 +252,38 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
struct inode *ci_inode;
/*
- * The master key with which this inode was unlocked (decrypted). This
+ * The master key with which this info was unlocked (decrypted). This
* will be NULL if the master key was found in a process-subscribed
* keyring rather than in the filesystem-level keyring.
*/
struct fscrypt_master_key *ci_master_key;
/*
- * Link in list of inodes that were unlocked with the master key.
+ * Link in list of infos that were unlocked with the master key.
* Only used when ->ci_master_key is set.
*/
struct list_head ci_master_key_link;
+ /* The encryption policy used by this object */
+ union fscrypt_policy ci_policy;
+
+ /* This object's nonce, copied from the fscrypt_context */
+ u8 ci_nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
+
+ /* Hashed inode number. Only set for IV_INO_LBLK_32 */
+ u32 ci_hashed_ino;
+};
+
+/*
+ * fscrypt_info - the "encryption key" for an inode
+ *
+ * When an encrypted file's key is made available, an instance of this struct is
+ * allocated and stored in ->i_crypt_info. Once created, it remains until the
+ * inode is evicted.
+ */
+struct fscrypt_info {
+ struct fscrypt_common_info info;
+
/*
* This inode's hash key for filenames. This is a 128-bit SipHash-2-4
* key. This is only set for directories that use a keyed dirhash over
@@ -261,24 +291,19 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
*/
siphash_key_t ci_dirhash_key;
bool ci_dirhash_key_initialized;
-
- /* The encryption policy used by this inode */
- union fscrypt_policy ci_policy;
-
- /* This inode's nonce, copied from the fscrypt_context */
- u8 ci_nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
-
- /* Hashed inode number. Only set for IV_INO_LBLK_32 */
- u32 ci_hashed_ino;
};
+/*
+ */
+
typedef enum {
FS_DECRYPT = 0,
FS_ENCRYPT,
} fscrypt_direction_t;
/**
- * fscrypt_get_lblk_info() - get the fscrypt_info to crypt a particular block
+ * fscrypt_get_lblk_info() - get the fscrypt_common_info to crypt a particular
+ * block
*
* @inode: the inode to which the block belongs
* @lblk: the offset of the block within the file which the inode
@@ -293,7 +318,7 @@ typedef enum {
*
* Return: the appropriate fscrypt_info if there is one, else NULL.
*/
-static inline struct fscrypt_info *
+static inline struct fscrypt_common_info *
fscrypt_get_lblk_info(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 *offset,
u64 *extent_len)
{
@@ -302,12 +327,12 @@ fscrypt_get_lblk_info(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 *offset,
if (extent_len)
*extent_len = U64_MAX;
- return inode->i_crypt_info;
+ return &inode->i_crypt_info->info;
}
/* crypto.c */
-extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep;
+extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_inode_info_cachep;
int fscrypt_initialize(struct super_block *sb);
int fscrypt_crypt_block(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
u64 lblk_num, struct page *src_page,
@@ -338,7 +363,7 @@ union fscrypt_iv {
};
void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci);
/* fname.c */
bool __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
@@ -376,17 +401,17 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf);
/* inline_crypt.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
-int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci);
static inline bool
-fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
return ci->ci_inlinecrypt;
}
int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci);
void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key);
@@ -397,7 +422,7 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
*/
static inline bool
fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
/*
* The two smp_load_acquire()'s here pair with the smp_store_release()'s
@@ -414,13 +439,13 @@ fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */
-static inline int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+static inline int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
return 0;
}
static inline bool
-fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
return false;
}
@@ -428,7 +453,7 @@ fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
static inline int
fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -442,7 +467,7 @@ fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
static inline bool
fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci)
{
return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm) != NULL;
}
@@ -499,7 +524,7 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key {
* A structural ref only guarantees that the struct continues to exist.
*
* There is one active ref associated with ->mk_secret being present,
- * and one active ref for each inode in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
+ * and one active ref for each inode in ->mk_decrypted_infos.
*
* There is one structural ref associated with the active refcount being
* nonzero. Finding a key in the keyring also takes a structural ref,
@@ -513,7 +538,7 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key {
/*
* The secret key material. After FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
* executed, this is wiped and no new inodes can be unlocked with this
- * key; however, there may still be inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes
+ * key; however, there may still be inodes in ->mk_decrypted_infos
* which could not be evicted. As long as some inodes still remain,
* FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can be retried, or
* FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can add the secret again.
@@ -552,8 +577,8 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key {
* List of inodes that were unlocked using this key. This allows the
* inodes to be evicted efficiently if the key is removed.
*/
- struct list_head mk_decrypted_inodes;
- spinlock_t mk_decrypted_inodes_lock;
+ struct list_head mk_decrypted_infos;
+ spinlock_t mk_decrypted_infos_lock;
/*
* Per-mode encryption keys for the various types of encryption policies
@@ -642,17 +667,18 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
extern struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[];
int fscrypt_prepare_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
- const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+ const u8 *raw_key,
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *ci);
void fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key);
-int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key);
+int fscrypt_set_per_info_enc_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key);
int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
-void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci,
const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported);
@@ -687,10 +713,10 @@ static inline int fscrypt_require_key(struct inode *inode)
void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key);
-int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+int fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci,
const u8 *raw_master_key);
-int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+int fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(struct fscrypt_common_info *ci);
/* policy.c */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
index 6238dbcadcad..3c1d51724768 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags)
{
struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci;
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
int err;
@@ -183,9 +184,10 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
if (err)
return err;
ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
- if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)
+ cci = &ci->info;
+ if (cci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)
return -EINVAL;
- mk = ci->ci_master_key;
+ mk = cci->ci_master_key;
down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
index 2d08abbf5892..09ec82b8a98a 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ static struct block_device **fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
return devs;
}
-static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
- unsigned int flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
+ struct super_block *sb = cci->ci_inode->i_sb;
+ unsigned int flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&cci->ci_policy);
int ino_bits = 64, lblk_bits = 64;
if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ static void fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
}
/* Enable inline encryption for this file if supported. */
-int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
+ const struct inode *inode = cci->ci_inode;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct blk_crypto_config crypto_cfg;
struct block_device **devs;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
return 0;
/* The crypto mode must have a blk-crypto counterpart */
- if (ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
+ if (cci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
return 0;
/* The filesystem must be mounted with -o inlinecrypt */
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
* doesn't work with IV_INO_LBLK_32. For now, simply exclude
* IV_INO_LBLK_32 with blocksize != PAGE_SIZE from inline encryption.
*/
- if ((fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
+ if ((fscrypt_policy_flags(&cci->ci_policy) &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) &&
sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE)
return 0;
@@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
* On all the filesystem's block devices, blk-crypto must support the
* crypto configuration that the file would use.
*/
- crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
+ crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = cci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = sb->s_blocksize;
- crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci);
+ crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(cci);
devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
if (IS_ERR(devs))
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
goto out_free_devs;
}
- fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(ci->ci_mode, devs, num_devs, &crypto_cfg);
+ fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(cci->ci_mode, devs, num_devs, &crypto_cfg);
- ci->ci_inlinecrypt = true;
+ cci->ci_inlinecrypt = true;
out_free_devs:
kfree(devs);
@@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
+ const struct inode *inode = cci->ci_inode;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
- enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
+ enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = cci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key;
struct block_device **devs;
unsigned int num_devs;
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
return -ENOMEM;
err = blk_crypto_init_key(blk_key, raw_key, crypto_mode,
- fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci), sb->s_blocksize);
+ fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(cci), sb->s_blocksize);
if (err) {
fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d initializing blk-crypto key", err);
goto fail;
@@ -228,21 +228,21 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
bool __fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(const struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inlinecrypt;
+ return inode->i_crypt_info->info.ci_inlinecrypt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto);
-static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, u64 lblk_num,
+static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci, u64 lblk_num,
u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
{
union fscrypt_iv iv;
int i;
- fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, cci);
BUILD_BUG_ON(FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
memset(dun, 0, BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
- for (i = 0; i < ci->ci_mode->ivsize/sizeof(dun[0]); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < cci->ci_mode->ivsize/sizeof(dun[0]); i++)
dun[i] = le64_to_cpu(iv.dun[i]);
}
@@ -265,16 +265,16 @@ static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, u64 lblk_num,
void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
u64 first_lblk, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci;
u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
u64 ci_offset = 0;
if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
return;
- ci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, first_lblk, &ci_offset, NULL);
+ cci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, first_lblk, &ci_offset, NULL);
- fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, ci_offset, dun);
- bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, ci->ci_enc_key->blk_key, dun, gfp_mask);
+ fscrypt_generate_dun(cci, ci_offset, dun);
+ bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, cci->ci_enc_key->blk_key, dun, gfp_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx);
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
{
const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
- struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci;
u64 ci_offset = 0;
if (!!bc != fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
@@ -358,16 +358,16 @@ bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
if (!bc)
return true;
- ci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, next_lblk, &ci_offset, NULL);
+ cci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, next_lblk, &ci_offset, NULL);
/*
* Comparing the key pointers is good enough, as all I/O for each key
* uses the same pointer. I.e., there's currently no need to support
* merging requests where the keys are the same but the pointers differ.
*/
- if (bc->bc_key != ci->ci_enc_key->blk_key)
+ if (bc->bc_key != cci->ci_enc_key->blk_key)
return false;
- fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, ci_offset, next_dun);
+ fscrypt_generate_dun(cci, ci_offset, next_dun);
return bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, next_dun);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio);
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_dio_supported);
*/
u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks)
{
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci;
u32 dun;
u64 ci_offset = 0;
u64 extent_len = 0;
@@ -471,18 +471,18 @@ u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks)
if (nr_blocks <= 1)
return nr_blocks;
- ci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, lblk, &ci_offset, &extent_len);
+ cci = fscrypt_get_lblk_info(inode, lblk, &ci_offset, &extent_len);
/* Spanning an extent boundary will change the DUN */
nr_blocks = min_t(u64, nr_blocks, extent_len);
- if (!(fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
+ if (!(fscrypt_policy_flags(&cci->ci_policy) &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32))
return nr_blocks;
/* With IV_INO_LBLK_32, the DUN can wrap around from U32_MAX to 0. */
- dun = ci->ci_hashed_ino + ci_offset;
+ dun = cci->ci_hashed_ino + ci_offset;
return min_t(u64, nr_blocks, (u64)U32_MAX + 1 - dun);
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index d153988b7403..27ae0345fa85 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* ->mk_active_refs == 0 implies that ->mk_secret is not present and
- * that ->mk_decrypted_inodes is empty.
+ * that ->mk_decrypted_infos is empty.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret));
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos));
for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {
fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ static int add_new_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
refcount_set(&mk->mk_struct_refs, 1);
mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
- spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos);
+ spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
if (mk_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
err = allocate_master_key_users_keyring(mk);
@@ -865,16 +865,16 @@ static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
d_prune_aliases(inode);
}
-static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_infos(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode *toput_inode = NULL;
- spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(ci, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes, ci_master_key_link) {
- inode = ci->ci_inode;
+ list_for_each_entry(cci, &mk->mk_decrypted_infos, ci_master_key_link) {
+ inode = cci->ci_inode;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
@@ -882,16 +882,16 @@ static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
}
__iget(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
shrink_dcache_inode(inode);
iput(toput_inode);
toput_inode = inode;
- spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
}
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
iput(toput_inode);
}
@@ -903,25 +903,25 @@ static int check_for_busy_inodes(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long ino;
char ino_str[50] = "";
- spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
- list_for_each(pos, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes)
+ list_for_each(pos, &mk->mk_decrypted_infos)
busy_count++;
if (busy_count == 0) {
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
return 0;
}
{
/* select an example file to show for debugging purposes */
struct inode *inode =
- list_first_entry(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes,
- struct fscrypt_info,
+ list_first_entry(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos,
+ struct fscrypt_common_info,
ci_master_key_link)->ci_inode;
ino = inode->i_ino;
}
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
/* If the inode is currently being created, ino may still be 0. */
if (ino)
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* An inode can't be evicted while it is dirty or has dirty pages.
- * Thus, we first have to clean the inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
+ * Thus, we first have to clean the inodes in ->mk_decrypted_infos.
*
* Just do it the easy way: call sync_filesystem(). It's overkill, but
* it works, and it's more important to minimize the amount of caches we
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
* and inappropriate for use by unprivileged users. So instead go
* through the inodes' alias lists and try to evict each dentry.
*/
- evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(mk);
+ evict_dentries_for_decrypted_infos(mk);
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index a19650f954e2..ae250e432dcd 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ select_encryption_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return &fscrypt_modes[fscrypt_policy_fnames_mode(policy)];
- WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load an encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
@@ -159,14 +159,14 @@ fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, const u8 *raw_key,
* and IV generation method (@ci->ci_policy.flags).
*/
int fscrypt_prepare_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
- const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
- if (fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(ci))
- return fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(prep_key, raw_key, ci);
+ if (fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(cci))
+ return fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(prep_key, raw_key, cci);
- tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode);
+ tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(cci->ci_mode, raw_key, cci->ci_inode);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
/*
@@ -188,15 +188,16 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(struct super_block *sb,
memzero_explicit(prep_key, sizeof(*prep_key));
}
-/* Given a per-file encryption key, set up the file's crypto transform object */
-int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
+/* Given a per-info encryption key, set up the info's crypto transform object */
+int fscrypt_set_per_info_enc_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
+ const u8 *raw_key)
{
- ci->ci_enc_key = kzalloc(sizeof(*ci->ci_enc_key), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ci->ci_enc_key)
+ cci->ci_enc_key = kzalloc(sizeof(*cci->ci_enc_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cci->ci_enc_key)
return -ENOMEM;
- ci->ci_enc_key->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_PER_INFO;
- return fscrypt_prepare_key(ci->ci_enc_key, raw_key, ci);
+ cci->ci_enc_key->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_PER_INFO;
+ return fscrypt_prepare_key(cci->ci_enc_key, raw_key, cci);
}
static struct fscrypt_prepared_key *
@@ -219,15 +220,15 @@ mk_prepared_key_for_mode_policy(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
}
static size_t
-fill_hkdf_info_for_mode_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+fill_hkdf_info_for_mode_key(const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
u8 hkdf_info[MAX_MODE_KEY_HKDF_INFO_SIZE])
{
- const u8 mode_num = ci->ci_mode - fscrypt_modes;
- const struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
+ const u8 mode_num = cci->ci_mode - fscrypt_modes;
+ const struct super_block *sb = cci->ci_inode->i_sb;
u8 hkdf_infolen = 0;
hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num;
- if (!(ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)) {
+ if (!(cci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)) {
memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid,
sizeof(sb->s_uuid));
hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid);
@@ -237,12 +238,12 @@ fill_hkdf_info_for_mode_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
static int setup_new_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
+ const struct inode *inode = cci->ci_inode;
const struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
- unsigned int policy_flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
- struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
+ unsigned int policy_flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&cci->ci_policy);
+ struct fscrypt_mode *mode = cci->ci_mode;
const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes;
u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)];
@@ -263,8 +264,8 @@ static int setup_new_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
}
/*
- * For DIRECT_KEY policies: instead of deriving per-file encryption
- * keys, the per-file nonce will be included in all the IVs. But
+ * For DIRECT_KEY policies: instead of deriving per-info encryption
+ * keys, the per-info nonce will be included in all the IVs. But
* unlike v1 policies, for v2 policies in this case we don't encrypt
* with the master key directly but rather derive a per-mode encryption
* key. This ensures that the master key is consistently used only for
@@ -278,13 +279,13 @@ static int setup_new_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
- if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci))
+ if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, cci))
goto out_unlock;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(mode_num) != 1);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hkdf_info) != MAX_MODE_KEY_HKDF_INFO_SIZE);
- hkdf_infolen = fill_hkdf_info_for_mode_key(ci, hkdf_info);
+ hkdf_infolen = fill_hkdf_info_for_mode_key(cci, hkdf_info);
err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
hkdf_context, hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen,
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ static int setup_new_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
if (err)
return err;
prep_key->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_MASTER_KEY;
- err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, ci);
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, cci);
memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize);
out_unlock:
@@ -300,10 +301,10 @@ static int setup_new_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
return err;
}
-static int setup_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+static int setup_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
+ struct fscrypt_mode *mode = cci->ci_mode;
const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes;
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key;
int err;
@@ -311,19 +312,19 @@ static int setup_mode_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mode_num > FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX))
return -EINVAL;
- prep_key = mk_prepared_key_for_mode_policy(mk, &ci->ci_policy, mode);
+ prep_key = mk_prepared_key_for_mode_policy(mk, &cci->ci_policy, mode);
if (IS_ERR(prep_key))
return PTR_ERR(prep_key);
- if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci)) {
- ci->ci_enc_key = prep_key;
+ if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, cci)) {
+ cci->ci_enc_key = prep_key;
return 0;
}
- err = setup_new_mode_prepared_key(mk, prep_key, ci);
+ err = setup_new_mode_prepared_key(mk, prep_key, cci);
if (err)
return err;
- ci->ci_enc_key = prep_key;
+ cci->ci_enc_key = prep_key;
return 0;
}
@@ -359,7 +360,7 @@ int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
int err;
err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
+ ci->info.ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
&ci->ci_dirhash_key);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -367,14 +368,14 @@ int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
return 0;
}
-void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized);
- ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino,
- &mk->mk_ino_hash_key);
+ cci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(cci->ci_inode->i_ino,
+ &mk->mk_ino_hash_key);
}
static int fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
@@ -403,25 +404,25 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
return err;
}
-static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+static int fscrypt_setup_v2_info_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
int err;
- if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_KEY_MASK) {
- err = setup_mode_prepared_key(ci, mk);
+ if (cci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_KEY_MASK) {
+ err = setup_mode_prepared_key(cci, mk);
} else {
u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
- derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ cci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
+ derived_key, cci->ci_mode->keysize);
if (err)
return err;
- err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
- memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ err = fscrypt_set_per_info_enc_key(cci, derived_key);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, cci->ci_mode->keysize);
}
return err;
@@ -430,13 +431,13 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
/*
* Find or create the appropriate prepared key for an info.
*/
-static int fscrypt_setup_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+static int fscrypt_setup_info_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
int err;
if (!mk) {
- if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
+ if (cci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
@@ -445,15 +446,15 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
* to before the search of ->s_master_keys, since users
* shouldn't be able to override filesystem-level keys.
*/
- return fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(ci);
+ return fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(cci);
}
- switch (ci->ci_policy.version) {
+ switch (cci->ci_policy.version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
- err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, mk->mk_secret.raw);
+ err = fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key(cci, mk->mk_secret.raw);
break;
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
- err = fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(ci, mk);
+ err = fscrypt_setup_v2_info_key(cci, mk);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -465,30 +466,30 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
/*
* Check whether the size of the given master key (@mk) is appropriate for the
- * encryption settings which a particular file will use (@ci).
+ * encryption settings which a particular info will use (@cci).
*
- * If the file uses a v1 encryption policy, then the master key must be at least
+ * If the info uses a v1 encryption policy, then the master key must be at least
* as long as the derived key, as this is a requirement of the v1 KDF.
*
* Otherwise, the KDF can accept any size key, so we enforce a slightly looser
* requirement: we require that the size of the master key be at least the
* maximum security strength of any algorithm whose key will be derived from it
- * (but in practice we only need to consider @ci->ci_mode, since any other
+ * (but in practice we only need to consider @cci->ci_mode, since any other
* possible subkeys such as DIRHASH and INODE_HASH will never increase the
- * required key size over @ci->ci_mode). This allows AES-256-XTS keys to be
+ * required key size over @cci->ci_mode). This allows AES-256-XTS keys to be
* derived from a 256-bit master key, which is cryptographically sufficient,
* rather than requiring a 512-bit master key which is unnecessarily long. (We
* still allow 512-bit master keys if the user chooses to use them, though.)
*/
static bool fscrypt_valid_master_key_size(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
- const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
unsigned int min_keysize;
- if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
- min_keysize = ci->ci_mode->keysize;
+ if (cci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
+ min_keysize = cci->ci_mode->keysize;
else
- min_keysize = ci->ci_mode->security_strength;
+ min_keysize = cci->ci_mode->security_strength;
if (mk->mk_secret.size < min_keysize) {
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
@@ -507,19 +508,19 @@ static bool fscrypt_valid_master_key_size(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
*
* If the master key is found in the filesystem-level keyring, then it is
* returned in *mk_ret with its semaphore read-locked. This is needed to ensure
- * that only one task links the fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as
+ * that only one task links inode fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_infos (as
* multiple tasks may race to create an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to
* synchronize the master key being removed with a new inode starting to use it.
*/
-static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
struct fscrypt_master_key **mk_ret)
{
- struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
+ struct super_block *sb = cci->ci_inode->i_sb;
struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
int err;
- err = fscrypt_policy_to_key_spec(&ci->ci_policy, &mk_spec);
+ err = fscrypt_policy_to_key_spec(&cci->ci_policy, &mk_spec);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -529,13 +530,13 @@ static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(sb);
/*
- * Add the test_dummy_encryption key on-demand. In principle,
+ * Add the test_dummy_encryption key on-demand. In princciple,
* it should be added at mount time. Do it here instead so that
* the individual filesystems don't need to worry about adding
* this key at mount time and cleaning up on mount failure.
*/
if (dummy_policy &&
- fscrypt_policies_equal(dummy_policy, &ci->ci_policy)) {
+ fscrypt_policies_equal(dummy_policy, &cci->ci_policy)) {
err = fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(sb, &mk_spec);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -544,7 +545,7 @@ static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
}
if (unlikely(!mk)) {
- if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
+ if (cci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
@@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
goto out_release_key;
}
- if (!fscrypt_valid_master_key_size(mk, ci)) {
+ if (!fscrypt_valid_master_key_size(mk, cci)) {
err = -ENOKEY;
goto out_release_key;
}
@@ -578,26 +579,24 @@ static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
return err;
}
-static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+static void free_prepared_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
- struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
-
- if (!ci)
- return;
-
- if (ci->ci_enc_key) {
- enum fscrypt_prepared_key_type type = ci->ci_enc_key->type;
+ if (cci->ci_enc_key) {
+ enum fscrypt_prepared_key_type type = cci->ci_enc_key->type;
if (type == FSCRYPT_KEY_DIRECT_V1)
- fscrypt_put_direct_key(ci->ci_enc_key);
+ fscrypt_put_direct_key(cci->ci_enc_key);
if (type == FSCRYPT_KEY_PER_INFO) {
- fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb,
- ci->ci_enc_key);
- kfree_sensitive(ci->ci_enc_key);
+ fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(cci->ci_inode->i_sb,
+ cci->ci_enc_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(cci->ci_enc_key);
}
}
+}
- mk = ci->ci_master_key;
+static void remove_info_from_mk_decrypted_list(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = cci->ci_master_key;
if (mk) {
/*
* Remove this inode from the list of inodes that were unlocked
@@ -605,22 +604,36 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
* inode from a master key struct that already had its secret
* removed, then complete the full removal of the struct.
*/
- spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
- list_del(&ci->ci_master_key_link);
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
- fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(ci->ci_inode->i_sb, mk);
+ spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
+ list_del(&cci->ci_master_key_link);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
+ fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(cci->ci_inode->i_sb, mk);
}
+}
+
+static void put_crypt_inode_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+{
+ if (!ci)
+ return;
+
+ free_prepared_key(&ci->info);
+ remove_info_from_mk_decrypted_list(&ci->info);
+
memzero_explicit(ci, sizeof(*ci));
- kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
+ kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_inode_info_cachep, ci);
}
-static int
-fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
- const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
- const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE],
- bool need_dirhash_key)
+/*
+ * Sets up the fscrypt_common_info structure, and returns the relevant master
+ * key, if any, locked, for further type-specific processing.
+ */
+static int fscrypt_setup_common_info(struct fscrypt_common_info *crypt_info,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
+ const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE],
+ fscrypt_ci_type_t type,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key **mk_ret)
{
- struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = NULL;
int res;
@@ -629,12 +642,10 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
if (res)
return res;
- crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!crypt_info)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
crypt_info->ci_inode = inode;
crypt_info->ci_policy = *policy;
+ crypt_info->ci_type = type;
+
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
mode = select_encryption_mode(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode);
@@ -653,7 +664,66 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
if (res)
goto out;
- res = fscrypt_setup_file_key(crypt_info, mk);
+ res = fscrypt_setup_info_key(crypt_info, mk);
+ if (res)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * The IV_INO_LBLK_32 policy needs a hashed inode number, but new
+ * inodes may not have an inode number assigned yet.
+ */
+ if (policy->version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 &&
+ (policy->v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) {
+ res = fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(mk);
+ if (res)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (inode->i_ino)
+ fscrypt_hash_inode_number(crypt_info, mk);
+ }
+
+ *mk_ret = mk;
+ return res;
+
+out:
+ if (mk) {
+ up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+ fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+static void add_info_to_mk_decrypted_list(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+{
+ if (mk) {
+ cci->ci_master_key = mk;
+ refcount_inc(&mk->mk_active_refs);
+ spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
+ list_add(&cci->ci_master_key_link, &mk->mk_decrypted_infos);
+ spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_infos_lock);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
+ const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
+ const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE],
+ bool need_dirhash_key)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_info *crypt_inode_info;
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *crypt_info;
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = NULL;
+ int res;
+
+ crypt_inode_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_inode_info_cachep,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!crypt_inode_info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ crypt_info = &crypt_inode_info->info;
+
+ res = fscrypt_setup_common_info(crypt_info, inode, policy, nonce,
+ CI_INODE, &mk);
if (res)
goto out;
@@ -668,23 +738,9 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
goto out;
}
- res = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(crypt_info, mk);
- if (res)
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * The IV_INO_LBLK_32 policy needs a hashed inode number, but new
- * inodes may not have an inode number assigned yet.
- */
- if (policy->version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 &&
- (policy->v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) {
- res = fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(mk);
+ res = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(crypt_inode_info, mk);
if (res)
goto out;
-
- if (inode->i_ino)
- fscrypt_hash_inode_number(crypt_info, mk);
}
/*
@@ -693,20 +749,14 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
* fscrypt_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_crypt_info with a
* RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it.
*/
- if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) {
+ if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL,
+ crypt_inode_info) == NULL) {
/*
* We won the race and set ->i_crypt_info to our crypt_info.
* Now link it into the master key's inode list.
*/
- if (mk) {
- crypt_info->ci_master_key = mk;
- refcount_inc(&mk->mk_active_refs);
- spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
- list_add(&crypt_info->ci_master_key_link,
- &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
- spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
- }
- crypt_info = NULL;
+ add_info_to_mk_decrypted_list(crypt_info, mk);
+ crypt_inode_info = NULL;
}
res = 0;
out:
@@ -714,7 +764,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
}
- put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
+ put_crypt_inode_info(crypt_inode_info);
return res;
}
@@ -843,7 +893,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode);
*/
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
- put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info);
+ put_crypt_inode_info(inode->i_crypt_info);
inode->i_crypt_info = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);
@@ -884,7 +934,7 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
* was provided via the legacy mechanism of the process-subscribed
* keyrings, so we don't know whether it's been removed or not.
*/
- if (!ci || !ci->ci_master_key)
+ if (!ci || !ci->info.ci_master_key)
return 0;
/*
@@ -904,6 +954,6 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
* then the thread removing the key will either evict the inode itself
* or will correctly detect that it wasn't evicted due to the race.
*/
- return !is_master_key_secret_present(&ci->ci_master_key->mk_secret);
+ return !is_master_key_secret_present(&ci->info.ci_master_key->mk_secret);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_drop_inode);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
index 1e785cedead0..b57ed49ac201 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
* This file implements compatibility functions for the original encryption
* policy version ("v1"), including:
*
- * - Deriving per-file encryption keys using the AES-128-ECB based KDF
+ * - Deriving per-info encryption keys using the AES-128-ECB based KDF
* (rather than the new method of using HKDF-SHA512)
*
* - Retrieving fscrypt master keys from process-subscribed keyrings
@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key)
*/
static struct fscrypt_direct_key *
find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *to_insert,
- const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+ const u8 *raw_key,
+ const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
unsigned long hash_key;
struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk;
@@ -193,19 +194,19 @@ find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *to_insert,
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hash_key) > FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- memcpy(&hash_key, ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+ memcpy(&hash_key, cci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(hash_key));
spin_lock(&fscrypt_direct_keys_lock);
hash_for_each_possible(fscrypt_direct_keys, dk, dk_node, hash_key) {
- if (memcmp(ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+ if (memcmp(cci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
dk->dk_descriptor, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
continue;
- if (ci->ci_mode != dk->dk_mode)
+ if (cci->ci_mode != dk->dk_mode)
continue;
- if (!fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&dk->dk_key, ci))
+ if (!fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&dk->dk_key, cci))
continue;
- if (crypto_memneq(raw_key, dk->dk_raw, ci->ci_mode->keysize))
+ if (crypto_memneq(raw_key, dk->dk_raw, cci->ci_mode->keysize))
continue;
/* using existing tfm with same (descriptor, mode, raw_key) */
refcount_inc(&dk->dk_refcount);
@@ -221,13 +222,13 @@ find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *to_insert,
/* Prepare to encrypt directly using the master key in the given mode */
static struct fscrypt_direct_key *
-fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
+fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_common_info *cci, const u8 *raw_key)
{
struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk;
int err;
/* Is there already a tfm for this key? */
- dk = find_or_insert_direct_key(NULL, raw_key, ci);
+ dk = find_or_insert_direct_key(NULL, raw_key, cci);
if (dk)
return dk;
@@ -235,18 +236,18 @@ fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
dk = kzalloc(sizeof(*dk), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dk)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- dk->dk_sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
+ dk->dk_sb = cci->ci_inode->i_sb;
refcount_set(&dk->dk_refcount, 1);
- dk->dk_mode = ci->ci_mode;
+ dk->dk_mode = cci->ci_mode;
dk->dk_key.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_DIRECT_V1;
- err = fscrypt_prepare_key(&dk->dk_key, raw_key, ci);
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_key(&dk->dk_key, raw_key, cci);
if (err)
goto err_free_dk;
- memcpy(dk->dk_descriptor, ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+ memcpy(dk->dk_descriptor, cci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- memcpy(dk->dk_raw, raw_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ memcpy(dk->dk_raw, raw_key, cci->ci_mode->keysize);
- return find_or_insert_direct_key(dk, raw_key, ci);
+ return find_or_insert_direct_key(dk, raw_key, cci);
err_free_dk:
free_direct_key(dk);
@@ -254,20 +255,20 @@ fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
}
/* v1 policy, DIRECT_KEY: use the master key directly */
-static int setup_v1_file_key_direct(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+static int setup_v1_info_key_direct(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
const u8 *raw_master_key)
{
struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk;
- dk = fscrypt_get_direct_key(ci, raw_master_key);
+ dk = fscrypt_get_direct_key(cci, raw_master_key);
if (IS_ERR(dk))
return PTR_ERR(dk);
- ci->ci_enc_key = &dk->dk_key;
+ cci->ci_enc_key = &dk->dk_key;
return 0;
}
-/* v1 policy, !DIRECT_KEY: derive the file's encryption key */
-static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+/* v1 policy, !DIRECT_KEY: derive the info's encryption key */
+static int setup_v1_info_key_derived(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
const u8 *raw_master_key)
{
u8 *derived_key;
@@ -277,47 +278,48 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it will be passed to the
* scatterlist crypto API during derive_key_aes().
*/
- derived_key = kmalloc(ci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ derived_key = kmalloc(cci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!derived_key)
return -ENOMEM;
- err = derive_key_aes(raw_master_key, ci->ci_nonce,
- derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ err = derive_key_aes(raw_master_key, cci->ci_nonce,
+ derived_key, cci->ci_mode->keysize);
if (err)
goto out;
- err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
+ err = fscrypt_set_per_info_enc_key(cci, derived_key);
out:
kfree_sensitive(derived_key);
return err;
}
-int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_master_key)
+int fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci,
+ const u8 *raw_master_key)
{
- if (ci->ci_policy.v1.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
- return setup_v1_file_key_direct(ci, raw_master_key);
+ if (cci->ci_policy.v1.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
+ return setup_v1_info_key_direct(cci, raw_master_key);
else
- return setup_v1_file_key_derived(ci, raw_master_key);
+ return setup_v1_info_key_derived(cci, raw_master_key);
}
-int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+int fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(struct fscrypt_common_info *cci)
{
struct key *key;
const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
int err;
key = find_and_lock_process_key(FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
- ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
- ci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
- if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && ci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
- key = find_and_lock_process_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
- ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
- ci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
+ cci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+ cci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
+ if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && cci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
+ key = find_and_lock_process_key(cci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
+ cci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+ cci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
}
if (IS_ERR(key))
return PTR_ERR(key);
- err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, payload->raw);
+ err = fscrypt_setup_v1_info_key(cci, payload->raw);
up_read(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
return err;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index f4456ecb3f87..ceb648669832 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, union fscrypt_policy *policy)
ci = fscrypt_get_info(inode);
if (ci) {
/* key available, use the cached policy */
- *policy = ci->ci_policy;
+ *policy = ci->info.ci_policy;
return 0;
}
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir)
err = fscrypt_require_key(dir);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
- return &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy;
+ return &dir->i_crypt_info->info.ci_policy;
}
return fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(dir->i_sb);
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ int fscrypt_context_for_new_inode(void *ctx, struct inode *inode)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ci))
return -ENOKEY;
- return fscrypt_new_context(ctx, &ci->ci_policy, ci->ci_nonce);
+ return fscrypt_new_context(ctx, &ci->info.ci_policy, ci->info.ci_nonce);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_context_for_new_inode);
@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_context_for_new_inode);
int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data)
{
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
+ struct fscrypt_common_info *cci = &ci->info;
union fscrypt_context ctx;
int ctxsize;
@@ -754,9 +755,9 @@ int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data)
* This may be the first time the inode number is available, so do any
* delayed key setup that requires the inode number.
*/
- if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 &&
- (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32))
- fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, ci->ci_master_key);
+ if (cci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 &&
+ (cci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32))
+ fscrypt_hash_inode_number(cci, cci->ci_master_key);
return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data);
}
--
2.41.0
|