When keys are prepared at the point of use, using a pooled prepared key,
we'll need to lock and check the existence of the master key secret in
multiple places. So go on and factor out the helper.
Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index 55c416df6a71..9cd60e09b0c5 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -106,6 +106,17 @@ select_encryption_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
+static int lock_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+{
+ down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+
+ /* Has the secret been removed (via FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY)? */
+ if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Prepare the crypto transform object or blk-crypto key in @prep_key, given the
* raw key, encryption mode (@ci->ci_mode), flag indicating which encryption
@@ -569,13 +580,10 @@ static int find_and_lock_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci,
*mk_ret = NULL;
return 0;
}
- down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
- /* Has the secret been removed (via FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY)? */
- if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
- err = -ENOKEY;
+ err = lock_master_key(mk);
+ if (err)
goto out_release_key;
- }
if (!fscrypt_valid_master_key_size(mk, ci)) {
err = -ENOKEY;
--
2.40.0
|