On Tuesday, November 6, 2018 6:55:03 AM IST Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Chandan, > > On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 03:13:14PM +0530, Chandan Rajendra wrote: > > On Friday, November 2, 2018 4:22:28 AM IST Eric Biggers wrote: > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > Add basic fs-verity support to ext4. fs-verity is a filesystem feature > > > that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of > > > read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: > > > a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) > > > time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. > > > See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for details. > > > > > > This patch adds everything except the data verification hooks that will > > > needed in ->readpages(). > > > > > > On ext4, enabling fs-verity on a file requires that the filesystem has > > > the 'verity' feature, e.g. that it was formatted with > > > 'mkfs.ext4 -O verity' or had 'tune2fs -O verity' run on it. > > > This requires e2fsprogs 1.44.4-2 or later. > > > > > > In ext4, we choose to retain the fs-verity metadata past the end of the > > > file rather than trying to move it into an external inode xattr, since > > > in practice keeping the metadata in-line actually results in the > > > simplest and most efficient implementation. One non-obvious advantage > > > of keeping the verity metadata in-line is that when fs-verity is > > > combined with fscrypt, the verity metadata naturally gets encrypted too; > > > this is actually necessary because it contains hashes of the plaintext. > > > > > > We also choose to keep the on-disk i_size equal to the original file > > > size, in order to make the 'verity' feature a RO_COMPAT feature. Thus, > > > ext4 has to find the fsverity_footer by looking in the last extent. > > > > > > Co-developed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > fs/ext4/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++++ > > > fs/ext4/ext4.h | 20 ++++++++++- > > > fs/ext4/file.c | 6 ++++ > > > fs/ext4/inode.c | 8 +++++ > > > fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 12 +++++++ > > > fs/ext4/super.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 6 ++++ > > > 7 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/ext4/Kconfig b/fs/ext4/Kconfig > > > index a453cc87082b5..5a76125ac0f8a 100644 > > > --- a/fs/ext4/Kconfig > > > +++ b/fs/ext4/Kconfig > > > @@ -111,6 +111,26 @@ config EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION > > > default y > > > depends on EXT4_ENCRYPTION > > > > > > +config EXT4_FS_VERITY > > > + bool "Ext4 Verity" > > > + depends on EXT4_FS > > > + select FS_VERITY > > > + help > > > + This option enables fs-verity for ext4. fs-verity is the > > > + dm-verity mechanism implemented at the file level. Userspace > > > + can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to a file, then enable > > > + fs-verity on the file. ext4 will then transparently verify > > > + any data read from the file against the Merkle tree. The file > > > + is also made read-only. > > > + > > > + This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the > > > + Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting > > > + various use cases where normally the whole file would need to > > > + be hashed at once, such as auditing and authenticity > > > + verification (appraisal). > > > + > > > + If unsure, say N. > > > + > > > config EXT4_DEBUG > > > bool "EXT4 debugging support" > > > depends on EXT4_FS > > > diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h > > > index 12f90d48ba613..e5475a629ed80 100644 > > > --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h > > > +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h > > > @@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ > > > #define __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION) > > > #include <linux/fscrypt.h> > > > > > > +#define __FS_HAS_VERITY IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY) > > > +#include <linux/fsverity.h> > > > + > > > #include <linux/compiler.h> > > > > > > /* Until this gets included into linux/compiler-gcc.h */ > > > @@ -405,6 +408,7 @@ struct flex_groups { > > > #define EXT4_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000 /* Top of directory hierarchies*/ > > > #define EXT4_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000 /* Set to each huge file */ > > > #define EXT4_EXTENTS_FL 0x00080000 /* Inode uses extents */ > > > +#define EXT4_VERITY_FL 0x00100000 /* Verity protected inode */ > > > #define EXT4_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000 /* Inode used for large EA */ > > > #define EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000 /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */ > > > #define EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL 0x10000000 /* Inode has inline data. */ > > > @@ -472,6 +476,7 @@ enum { > > > EXT4_INODE_TOPDIR = 17, /* Top of directory hierarchies*/ > > > EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE = 18, /* Set to each huge file */ > > > EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS = 19, /* Inode uses extents */ > > > + EXT4_INODE_VERITY = 20, /* Verity protected inode */ > > > EXT4_INODE_EA_INODE = 21, /* Inode used for large EA */ > > > EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS = 22, /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */ > > > EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA = 28, /* Data in inode. */ > > > @@ -517,6 +522,7 @@ static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void) > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(TOPDIR); > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(HUGE_FILE); > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EXTENTS); > > > + CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(VERITY); > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EA_INODE); > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EOFBLOCKS); > > > CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(INLINE_DATA); > > > @@ -1654,6 +1660,7 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei) > > > #define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM 0x0400 > > > #define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_READONLY 0x1000 > > > #define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT 0x2000 > > > +#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY 0x8000 > > > > > > #define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_COMPRESSION 0x0001 > > > #define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FILETYPE 0x0002 > > > @@ -1742,6 +1749,7 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(bigalloc, BIGALLOC) > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(metadata_csum, METADATA_CSUM) > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(readonly, READONLY) > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(project, PROJECT) > > > +EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(verity, VERITY) > > > > > > EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(compression, COMPRESSION) > > > EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(filetype, FILETYPE) > > > @@ -1797,7 +1805,8 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(encrypt, ENCRYPT) > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_BIGALLOC |\ > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM|\ > > > EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_QUOTA |\ > > > - EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT) > > > + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT |\ > > > + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY) > > > > > > #define EXTN_FEATURE_FUNCS(ver) \ > > > static inline bool ext4_has_unknown_ext##ver##_compat_features(struct super_block *sb) \ > > > @@ -2293,6 +2302,15 @@ static inline bool ext4_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode) > > > return ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT); > > > } > > > > > > +static inline bool ext4_verity_inode(struct inode *inode) > > > +{ > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > > > + return ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY); > > > +#else > > > + return false; > > > +#endif > > > +} > > > + > > > > Hi Eric, > > > > Can you please explain as to why we check for the presence of > > EXT4_INODE_VERITY flag only when fsverity is enabled during kernel build? > > > > Good question, this might not be the best approach actually; I think this was > originally copied from the f2fs version. It does reduce the overhead introduced > by the fs-verity changes in the !CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY case. But it will allow > opening verity files, even for writing which will corrupt them. > > Probably we should make ext4_verity_inode() work regardless of > CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY, so open(), truncate(), etc. will fail with EOPNOTSUPP on > verity files when !CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY, like how ext4 encryption works. > Yes, I agree with what you say. I have followed the above explained logic when implementing S_VERITY and IS_VERITY() for Ext4 and will extend that to F2FS as well. -- chandan
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