Hi Chuck, On Sun, Aug 26, 2018 at 12:22:08PM -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > Hi Eric- > > Context: I'm working on IMA support for NFSv4, and would like to > use fs-verity (or some Merkle tree-like mechanism) eventually to > help address the performance impacts of using IMA with large NFS > files. > > > > On Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. > > This description suggests that the only way fs-verity can work is > by placing the Merkle tree data after EOF. Further, this organi- > zation is exposed to user space, making it a fixed part of the > fs-verity kernel/user space API. > > Remote filesystems -- esp. NFS -- would prefer to manage the Merkle > tree data in other ways. The NFSv4 protocol, for example, supports > named streams (as some other filesystems do), and could store the > Merkle trees in those. Or, a new pNFS layout type could be con- > structed where Merkle trees are stored separately from a file's > content -- perhaps even on a separate file server. > > File servers can store this data as the servers' local filesystems > require. > > Sharing how the Merkle tree is created and used is sensible, but > IMHO the filesystem implementations should be allowed to store this > tree however they find convenient. The Merkle trees should be > exposed via a clean API, not as part of the file's content. > There has also been discussion with this on the thread for patch 02/10. "A Merkle tree hidden past the end of the file" describes how ext4 and f2fs are proposed to implement it, and it describes the file format expected by FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. But, at FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY time, a filesystem could copy the verity metadata to somewhere else if it wanted, e.g. into a file stream, and then truncate the file to its original size. Afterwards, fs-verity doesn't really care where the metadata is stored. Currently it does actually assume it's beyond EOF since it calls read_mapping_page() directly, but that could be replaced at any time with indirection via a method fsverity_operations.read_metadata_page(). We actually had such a method originally, but it turned out to be unnecessary for ext4 and f2fs, so I had dropped it for now. I will make this clearer in the next revision of the patchset, and maybe even consider reintroducing ->read_metadata_page() to make it clear that filesystems don't necessarily have to store the metadata beyond EOF. Thanks, - Eric
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