On Mon, May 07, 2018 at 05:22:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end > mobile devices have older CPUs that don't have AES instructions, e.g. > the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions. Currently, user data on such devices > is not encrypted at rest because AES is too slow, even when the NEON > bit-sliced implementation of AES is used. Unfortunately, it is > infeasible to encrypt these devices at all when AES is the only option. > > Therefore, this patch updates fscrypt to support the Speck block cipher, > which was recently added to the crypto API. The C implementation of > Speck is not especially fast, but Speck can be implemented very > efficiently with general-purpose vector instructions, e.g. ARM NEON. > For example, on an ARMv7 processor, we measured the NEON-accelerated > Speck128/256-XTS at 69 MB/s for both encryption and decryption, while > AES-256-XTS with the NEON bit-sliced implementation was only 22 MB/s > encryption and 19 MB/s decryption. > > There are multiple variants of Speck. This patch only adds support for > Speck128/256, which is the variant with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit > key size -- the same as AES-256. This is believed to be the most secure > variant of Speck, and it's only about 6% slower than Speck128/128. > Speck64/128 would be at least 20% faster because it has 20% rounds, and > it can be even faster on CPUs that can't efficiently do the 64-bit > operations needed for Speck128. However, Speck64's 64-bit block size is > not preferred security-wise. ARM NEON also supports the needed 64-bit > operations even on 32-bit CPUs, resulting in Speck128 being fast enough > for our targeted use cases so far. > > The chosen modes of operation are XTS for contents and CTS-CBC for > filenames. These are the same modes of operation that fscrypt defaults > to for AES. Note that as with the other fscrypt modes, Speck will not > be used unless userspace chooses to use it. Nor are any of the existing > modes (which are all AES-based) being removed, of course. > > We intentionally don't make CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select > CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK, so people will have to enable Speck support > themselves if they need it. This is because we shouldn't bloat the > FS_ENCRYPTION dependencies with every new cipher, especially ones that > aren't recommended for most users. Moreover, CRYPTO_SPECK is just the > generic implementation, which won't be fast enough for many users; in > practice, they'll need to enable CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON to get acceptable > performance. > > More details about our choice of Speck can be found in our patches that > added Speck to the crypto API, and the follow-on discussion threads. > We're planning a publication that explains the choice in more detail. > But briefly, we can't use ChaCha20 as we previously proposed, since it > would be insecure to use a stream cipher in this context, with potential > IV reuse during writes on f2fs and/or on wear-leveling flash storage. > > We also evaluated many other lightweight and/or ARX-based block ciphers > such as Chaskey-LTS, RC5, LEA, CHAM, Threefish, RC6, NOEKEON, SPARX, and > XTEA. However, all had disadvantages vs. Speck, such as insufficient > performance with NEON, much less published cryptanalysis, or an > insufficient security level. Various design choices in Speck make it > perform better with NEON than competing ciphers while still having a > security margin similar to AES, and in the case of Speck128 also the > same available security levels. Unfortunately, Speck does have some > political baggage attached -- it's an NSA designed cipher, and was > rejected from an ISO standard (though for context, as far as I know none > of the above-mentioned alternatives are ISO standards either). > Nevertheless, we believe it is a good solution to the problem from a > technical perspective. > > Certain algorithms constructed from ChaCha or the ChaCha permutation, > such as MEM (Masked Even-Mansour) or HPolyC, may also meet our > performance requirements. However, these are new constructions that > need more time to receive the cryptographic review and acceptance needed > to be confident in their security. HPolyC hasn't been published yet, > and we are concerned that MEM makes stronger assumptions about the > underlying permutation than the ChaCha stream cipher does. In contrast, > the XTS mode of operation is relatively well accepted, and Speck has > over 70 cryptanalysis papers. Of course, these ChaCha-based algorithms > can still be added later if they become ready. > > The best known attack on Speck128/256 is a differential cryptanalysis > attack on 25 of 34 rounds with 2^253 time complexity and 2^125 chosen > plaintexts, i.e. only marginally faster than brute force. There is no > known attack on the full 34 rounds. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> Applied, thanks. - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fscrypt" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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