On 2018/3/9 15:53, Sheng Yong wrote:
> This patch introduces a new mount option `test_dummy_encryption' to
> allow fscrypt to create a fake fscrypt context. This is used by xfstests.
It needs to add doc for this new mount option.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/f2fs/dir.c | 4 +++-
> fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 11 +++++++++++
> fs/f2fs/namei.c | 9 ++++++---
> fs/f2fs/super.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
> index 797eb05cb538..73ddc35fba4f 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
> @@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ struct page *init_inode_metadata(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> struct page *dpage)
> {
> struct page *page;
> + int dummy_encrypt = DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(F2FS_I_SB(dir));
> int err;
>
> if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NEW_INODE)) {
> @@ -387,7 +388,8 @@ struct page *init_inode_metadata(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> if (err)
> goto put_error;
>
> - if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) && f2fs_may_encrypt(inode)) {
> + if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) || dummy_encrypt) &&
> + f2fs_may_encrypt(inode)) {
> err = fscrypt_inherit_context(dir, inode, page, false);
> if (err)
> goto put_error;
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> index 31f39ab7fce4..c0dbd8b6050b 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> @@ -1053,6 +1053,15 @@ enum {
> ALLOC_MODE_REUSE, /* reuse segments as much as possible */
> };
>
> +#define F2FS_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION 0x0001
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION
> +#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (unlikely((sbi)->mount_flags & \
> + F2FS_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION))
> +#else
> +#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0)
> +#endif
> +
> struct f2fs_sb_info {
> struct super_block *sb; /* pointer to VFS super block */
> struct proc_dir_entry *s_proc; /* proc entry */
> @@ -1242,6 +1251,8 @@ struct f2fs_sb_info {
>
> /* segment allocation policy */
> int alloc_mode;
> +
> + unsigned int mount_flags;
> };
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> index 318dfe870cb5..5dd6a112e13d 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static struct inode *f2fs_new_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode)
> set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NEW_INODE);
>
> /* If the directory encrypted, then we should encrypt the inode. */
> - if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) && f2fs_may_encrypt(inode))
> + if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) || DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) &&
> + f2fs_may_encrypt(inode))
> f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(inode);
>
> if (f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi->sb)) {
> @@ -788,10 +789,12 @@ static int __f2fs_tmpfile(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>
> static int f2fs_tmpfile(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
> {
> - if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(F2FS_I_SB(dir))))
> + struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(dir);
> +
> + if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi)))
> return -EIO;
>
> - if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir)) {
> + if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) || DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) {
Why we need to add this condition here?
> int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
> if (err)
> return err;
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
> index b9a6b97c3bd3..345e4f63f6fc 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
> @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ enum {
> Opt_jqfmt_vfsv1,
> Opt_whint,
> Opt_alloc,
> + Opt_test_dummy_encryption,
> Opt_err,
> };
>
> @@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
> {Opt_jqfmt_vfsv1, "jqfmt=vfsv1"},
> {Opt_whint, "whint_mode=%s"},
> {Opt_alloc, "alloc_mode=%s"},
> + {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, "test_dummy_encryption"},
> {Opt_err, NULL},
> };
>
> @@ -719,6 +721,16 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
> }
> kfree(name);
> break;
> + case Opt_test_dummy_encryption:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION
> + sbi->mount_flags |= F2FS_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION;
> + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
> + "Test dummy encryption mode enabled");
> +#else
> + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
> + "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored");
> +#endif
> + break;
> default:
> f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
> "Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value",
> @@ -1282,6 +1294,10 @@ static int f2fs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
> seq_printf(seq, ",whint_mode=%s", "user-based");
> else if (sbi->whint_mode == WHINT_MODE_FS)
> seq_printf(seq, ",whint_mode=%s", "fs-based");
> +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION
> + if (sbi->mount_flags & F2FS_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION)
> + seq_puts(seq, ",test_dummy_encryption");
> +#endif
>
> if (sbi->alloc_mode == ALLOC_MODE_DEFAULT)
> seq_printf(seq, ",alloc_mode=%s", "default");
> @@ -1882,6 +1898,11 @@ static int f2fs_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
> ctx, len, fs_data, XATTR_CREATE);
> }
>
> +static bool f2fs_dummy_context(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + return DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(F2FS_I_SB(inode));
> +}
> +
> static unsigned f2fs_max_namelen(struct inode *inode)
> {
> return S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ?
> @@ -1892,6 +1913,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations f2fs_cryptops = {
> .key_prefix = "f2fs:",
> .get_context = f2fs_get_context,
> .set_context = f2fs_set_context,
> + .dummy_context = f2fs_dummy_context,
> .empty_dir = f2fs_empty_dir,
> .max_namelen = f2fs_max_namelen,
> };
> @@ -2620,6 +2642,15 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> if (err)
> goto free_options;
>
> + if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) &&
> + (sb_rdonly(sb) || !f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(sb))) {
Use f2fs_readonly() here which can wrap sb_rdonly()?
> + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
> + "Encrypt feature is off or filesystem is read-only");
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + retry = false;
> + goto free_options;
> + }
How about moving this check into parse_options(), so we can check this condition
in remount_fs() too.
Thanks,
> +
> sbi->max_file_blocks = max_file_blocks();
> sb->s_maxbytes = sbi->max_file_blocks <<
> le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
>
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