On 8 December 2017 at 09:11, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Eric, > > On 8 December 2017 at 01:38, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> >> >> fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end >> mobile devices still use older CPUs such as ARMv7, which do not support >> the AES instructions (the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions). This results >> in very poor AES performance, even if the NEON bit-sliced implementation >> is used. Roughly 20-40 MB/s is a typical number, in comparison to >> 300-800 MB/s on CPUs that support the AES instructions. Switching from >> AES-256 to AES-128 only helps by about 30%. >> >> The result is that vendors don't enable encryption on these devices, >> leaving users unprotected. >> >> A performance difference of similar magnitude can also be observed on >> x86, between CPUs with and without the AES-NI instruction set. >> >> This patch provides an alternative to AES by updating fscrypt to support >> the ChaCha20 stream cipher (RFC7539) for contents encryption. ChaCha20 >> was designed to have a large security margin, to be efficient on >> general-purpose CPUs without dedicated instructions, and to be >> vectorizable. It is already supported by the Linux crypto API, >> including a vectorized implementation for ARM using NEON instructions, >> and vectorized implementations for x86 using SSSE3 or AVX2 instructions. >> >> On 32-bit ARM processors with NEON support, ChaCha20 is about 3.2 times >> faster than AES-128-XTS (chacha20-neon vs. xts-aes-neonbs). Without >> NEON support, ChaCha20 is about 1.5 times as fast (chacha20-generic vs. >> xts(aes-asm)). The improvement over AES-256-XTS is even greater. >> >> Note that stream ciphers are not an ideal choice for disk encryption, >> since each data block has to be encrypted with the same IV each time it >> is overwritten. Consequently, an adversary who observes the ciphertext >> both before and after a write can trivially recover the keystream if >> they can guess one of the plaintexts. Moreover, an adversary who can >> write to the ciphertext can flip arbitrary bits in the plaintext, merely >> by flipping the corresponding bits in the ciphertext. A block cipher >> operating in the XTS or CBC-ESSIV mode provides some protection against >> these types of attacks -- albeit not full protection, which would at >> minimum require the use an authenticated encryption mode with nonces. >> >> Unfortunately, we are unaware of any block cipher which performs as well >> as ChaCha20, has a similar or greater security margin, and has been >> subject to as much public security analysis. We do not consider Speck >> to be a viable alternative at this time. >> >> Still, a stream cipher is sufficient to protect data confidentiality in >> the event of a single point-in-time permanent offline compromise of the >> disk, which currently is the primary threat model for fscrypt. Thus, >> when the alternative is quite literally *no encryption*, we might as >> well use a stream cipher. >> >> We offer ChaCha20 rather than the reduced-round variants ChaCha8 or >> ChaCha12 because ChaCha20 has a much higher security margin, and we are >> primarily targeting CPUs where ChaCha20 is fast enough, in particular >> CPUs that have vector instructions such as NEON or SSSE3. Also, the >> crypto API currently only supports ChaCha20. Still, if ChaCha8 and/or >> ChaCha12 support were to be added to the crypto API, it would be >> straightforward to support them in fscrypt too. >> >> Currently, stream ciphers cannot be used for filenames encryption with >> fscrypt because all filenames in a directory have to be encrypted with >> the same IV. Therefore, we offer ChaCha20 for contents encryption only. >> Filenames encryption still must use AES-256-CTS-CBC. This is acceptable >> because filenames encryption is not as performance-critical as contents >> encryption. >> >> Reviewed-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 43 +++++++++++++++++++--- >> fs/crypto/Kconfig | 1 + >> fs/crypto/crypto.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- >> fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 2 + >> include/linux/fscrypt.h | 6 ++- >> include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 1 + >> 6 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst >> index 776ddc655f79..927d3c88816b 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst >> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst >> @@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ replaced with HKDF or another more standard KDF in the future. >> Encryption modes and usage >> ========================== >> >> +Available modes >> +--------------- >> + >> fscrypt allows one encryption mode to be specified for file contents >> and one encryption mode to be specified for filenames. Different >> directory trees are permitted to use different encryption modes. >> @@ -191,24 +194,52 @@ Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported: >> >> - AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames >> - AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames >> +- ChaCha20 for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames >> >> It is strongly recommended to use AES-256-XTS for contents encryption. >> AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with >> crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. >> >> +Similarly, ChaCha20 was only added for low-end devices that have >> +neither a CPU with AES instructions, nor a hardware crypto >> +accelerator. Note that since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, it is >> +easily broken if an attacker can view encrypted data both before and >> +after it is overwritten. Thus, even moreso than the other modes, >> +ChaCha20 can protect data confidentiality *only* in the event of a >> +single point-in-time, permanent offline compromise of the storage. >> +Also, ChaCha20 is supported only for contents encryption, not >> +filenames encryption, because all filenames in a directory have to be >> +encrypted with the same IV, which would be especially inappropriate >> +for a stream cipher. >> + >> New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes >> to individual filesystems. However, authenticated encryption (AE) >> modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing >> with ciphertext expansion. >> >> +Contents encryption >> +------------------- >> + >> For file contents, each filesystem block is encrypted independently. >> Currently, only the case where the filesystem block size is equal to >> -the system's page size (usually 4096 bytes) is supported. With the >> -XTS mode of operation (recommended), the logical block number within >> -the file is used as the IV. With the CBC mode of operation (not >> -recommended), ESSIV is used; specifically, the IV for CBC is the >> -logical block number encrypted with AES-256, where the AES-256 key is >> -the SHA-256 hash of the inode's data encryption key. >> +the system's page size (usually 4096 bytes) is supported. >> + >> +With the XTS mode of operation, the logical block number within the >> +file is used as the IV. >> + >> +With the CBC mode of operation, ESSIV is used. Specifically, the IV >> +is the file logical block number encrypted with AES-256, where the >> +AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash of the inode's data encryption key. >> + >> +With ChaCha20, the file logical block number is also used as the IV, >> +but it is formatted differently to ensure that it is copied into the >> +"nonce" portion of the ChaCha20 initial state (words 14-15) rather >> +than the "block counter" portion (words 12-13). This detail is >> +critical, since otherwise different portions of the file would be >> +encrypted with the same keystream. >> + >> +Filenames encryption >> +-------------------- >> >> For filenames, the full filename is encrypted at once. Because of the >> requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and >> diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig >> index 02b7d91c9231..44f052e9d842 100644 >> --- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig >> +++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig >> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION >> select CRYPTO >> select CRYPTO_AES >> select CRYPTO_CBC >> + select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 >> select CRYPTO_ECB >> select CRYPTO_XTS >> select CRYPTO_CTS >> diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c >> index 732a786cce9d..d5c95a18db59 100644 >> --- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c >> +++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c >> @@ -126,15 +126,66 @@ struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp_flags) >> } >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_ctx); >> >> +struct fscrypt_iv { >> + __le64 first_half; >> + __le64 second_half; >> +}; >> + >> +/* >> + * Generate the IV for encrypting/decrypting the block at the given logical >> + * block number within a file. >> + */ >> +static void fscrypt_generate_iv(struct fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, >> + const struct fscrypt_info *ci) >> +{ >> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*iv) != FS_IV_SIZE); >> + >> + if (ci->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_CHACHA20) { >> + /* >> + * ChaCha20 interprets its IV as a block counter followed by a >> + * nonce. We *MUST NOT* use the file logical block number as >> + * the Chacha block counter because the ChaCha block counter >> + * counts 64-byte ChaCha blocks, which are much smaller than >> + * file blocks. If we did, then portions of the keystream would >> + * be repeated, which would be catastrophic. >> + * > > OK, so you are saying that LBA n + 1 will share its keystream with LBA > n but shift by 64 blocks, right? Yeah, that's terrible. > shift-ed by 64 *bytes* -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fscrypt" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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