From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> digsig_verify() requests a user key, then accesses its payload. However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore. Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was already revoked at the time it was requested. Fixes: 051dbb918c7f ("crypto: digital signature verification support") Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> [v3.3+] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> --- lib/digsig.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index 03d7c63837ae..6ba6fcd92dd1 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -87,6 +87,12 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, down_read(&key->sem); ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key); + if (!ukp) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + err = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto err1; + } + if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh)) goto err1; -- 2.14.2.822.g60be5d43e6-goog -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fscrypt" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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