On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 5:00 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > >.... > Solve the problem for v2 encryption policies by storing a "hash" of the > master encryption key in the encryption xattr and verifying it before > accepting the user-provided key. > ... Forgive my ignorance... Doesn't that setup an oracle so an attacker can query keys? It seems like the problem is deeper into the design. Namely, the caching and sharing of keys. Jeff -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fscrypt" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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