On Tue 23-05-17 09:13:54, Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Jan, > > On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 10:24:10AM +0200, Jan Kara wrote: > > On Mon 22-05-17 17:53:16, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in > > > such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an > > > additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never > > > be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in > > > ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, > > > which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc. > > > > > > Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON(). > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Yeah, the check is rather before the BUG_ON so I guess that there's no > > big point in the BUG_ON. When looking at this code I have one question > > though: > > > > So when you mount the filesystem with 'dioread_nolock', do overwriting > > direct write to the file, and just after we do inode_unlock() in > > ext4_direct_IO_write() someone calls EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY > > ioctl on the file, the BUG_ON could actually trigger. So I think you > > need to wait for outstanding direct IO for the file when setting > > encryption policy. Likely in ext4_set_context() or maybe in the generic > > fscrypt code (you need to wait after acquiring inode_lock), I'm not > > sure how other filesystems using fscrypt handle this and whether it > > would make more sense in the generic code or in ext4 specific one. > > > > That's not possible because the ioctl can only set an encryption policy > on a directory, and specifically an empty one. Other files can only > acquire an encryption policy through inheritance. There have been > thoughts about implementing "in-place" encryption but it's not something > we currently support. Ah, good. Thanks for explanation. Then you can add: Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx> to your patch. Honza -- Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxxx> SUSE Labs, CR -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fscrypt" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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