Hi Peter, On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 3:57 PM, Peter Malone <peter.malone@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in > sbusfb_ioctl_helper(). > > 'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper(). > We retrieve this from the user: > if (get_user(index, &c->index) || > __get_user(count, &c->count) || > __get_user(ured, &c->red) || > __get_user(ugreen, &c->green) || > __get_user(ublue, &c->blue)) > return -EFAULT; > > and then we use 'index' in the following way: > red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8; > green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8; > blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8; > > This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be > an unsigned int, given its usage above. > > This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int > in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC. > > Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <peter.malone@xxxxxxxxx> > --- much better :) > v2: fixed formatting > > drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c > index af6fc97f4ba4..a436d44f1b7f 100644 > --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c > +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c > @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg, > unsigned char __user *ured; > unsigned char __user *ugreen; > unsigned char __user *ublue; > - int index, count, i; > + unsigned int index, count, i; > > if (get_user(index, &c->index) || > __get_user(count, &c->count) || > @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg, > unsigned char __user *ugreen; > unsigned char __user *ublue; > struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap; > - int index, count, i; > + unsigned int index, count, i; > u8 red, green, blue; > > if (get_user(index, &c->index) || > -- > 2.14.3 > By just looking at the code and commit message: Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@xxxxxxxxxx> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fbdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html