On Thu, Aug 17, 2023 at 12:11:18PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Thu, Aug 17, 2023 at 09:47:48AM -0500, Eric Sandeen wrote: > > > > Just to play devil's advocate here - (sorry) - I don't see this as any > > different from any other "malicious" filesystem image. > > > > I've never been a fan of the idea that malicious images are real security > > threats, but whether the parking lot USB stick paniced the box in an > > unexpected way or "on purpose," the result is the same ... > > > > I wonder if it might make sense to put EXT4_MOUNT_ERRORS_PANIC under a > > sysctl or something, so that admins can enable it only when needed. > > Well, if someone is stupid enough to plug in a parking lot USB stick > into their system, they get everything they deserve. And a forced > panic isn't going to lead a more privilege escalation attack, so I > really don't see a problem if a file system which is marked "panic on > error", well, causes a panic. It's a good way of (harmlessly) > punishing stupid user tricks. :-) > > The other way of thinking about it is that if your threat model > includes an attacker with physical access to the server with a USB > port, attacks include a cable which has a USB port on one side, and a > 120V/240V AC mains plug on the the other. This will very likely cause > a system shutdown, even if they don't have automount enabled. :-) > Eric S. is correct that for a filesystem image to enable panic on error, support for panic on error should have to be properly consented to by the kernel configuration, for example through an fs.allow_panic_on_error sysctl. It can be argued that this not important, or not worth implementing when the default will need to remain 1 for backwards compatibility. Or even that syzkaller should work around it in the mean time. But it is incorrect to write "This is fundamentally a syzbot bug." - Eric