On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 08:51:42AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote: > On Sa, 14.09.19 09:30, Linus Torvalds (torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote: [...] > > And please don't break /dev/urandom again. The above code is the ony > way I see how we can make /dev/urandom-derived swap encryption safe, > and the only way I can see how we can sanely write a valid random seed > to disk after boot. > Any hope in making systemd-random-seed(8) credit that "random seed from previous boot" file, through RNDADDENTROPY, *by default*? Because of course this makes the problem reliably go away on my system too (as discussed in the original bug report, but you were not CCed). I know that by v243, just released 12 days ago, this can be optionally done through SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT=1. I wonder though if it can ever be done by default, just like what the BSDs does... This would solve a big part of the current problem. > Lennart thanks, -- darwi http://darwish.chasingpointers.com
