On Mar 1, 2018, at 1:09 PM, Andreas Dilger <adilger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > If an unknown flag is present in a FIEMAP extent, it is printed as a > hex value into a temporary buffer before adding it to the flags. If > that unknown flag is over 0xffff then it will overflow the temporary > buffer. Correction, any unknown flag over 0xfff would overflow the old buffer size. > Reported-by: Sarah Liu <wei3.liu@xxxxxxxxx> > Intel-bug-id: https://jira.hpdd.intel.com/browse/LU-10335 > Signed-off-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > misc/filefrag.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/misc/filefrag.c b/misc/filefrag.c > index 9c57ab9..dc00393 100644 > --- a/misc/filefrag.c > +++ b/misc/filefrag.c > @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static void print_extent_info(struct fiemap_extent *fm_extent, int cur_ex, > print_flag(&fe_flags, FIEMAP_EXTENT_SHARED, flags, "shared,"); > /* print any unknown flags as hex values */ > for (mask = 1; fe_flags != 0 && mask != 0; mask <<= 1) { > - char hex[6]; > + char hex[sizeof(mask) * 2 + 4]; /* 2 chars/byte + 0x, + NUL */ > > if ((fe_flags & mask) == 0) > continue; > -- > 1.8.0 > Cheers, Andreas
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