Re: [PATCH 1/3] fscrypt: fix loophole in one-encryption-policy-per-tree enforcement

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On 15.12.2016 20:19, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Filesystem encryption is designed to enforce that all files in an
> encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy.  Operations
> that violate this constraint are supposed to fail with EPERM.  There was
> one case that was missed, however: the cross-rename operation (i.e.
> renameat2 with RENAME_EXCHANGE) allowed two files with different
> encryption policies to be exchanged, provided that neither encryption
> key was available.
> 
> To fix this, when we can't compare the fscrypt_info structs because the
> key is unavailable, compare the fscrypt_context structs instead.
> 
> This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset.
> 
> Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx>

Thanks,
//richard
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