On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 11:18 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 10:50 AM EET, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > On Fri, 1 Nov 2024 at 01:40, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 2:33 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it > > > > > >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the > > > > > >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Can we make progress on this please? > > > > > > > > > > > > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches: > > > > > > > > > > > > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree > > > > > > is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this > > > > > > is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that > > > > > > angle. > > > > > > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20. > > > > > > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the > > > > > > locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of > > > > > > the patch set. > > > > > > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality > > > > > > to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this. > > > > > > Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)? > > > > > > > > > > Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns in > > > > > replies to the actual patches? > > > > > > > > - 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is done > > > > so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it". > > > > - 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it is, > > > > the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be > > > > picked up to stable kernels. > > > > - 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the > > > > privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really > > > > concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel > > > > command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only. > > > > > > > > So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort > > > > out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural concern > > > > for kernel overall. > > > > > > Further: > > > > > > 15/20: I can accept this without reported-by tag (or changed as > > > suggested-by). It does not harm. > > > 16/20: I'll re-review this with time. I'll try to get this done > > > latest next week. > > > > > > So let's put focus only on 17 and 18. Can this problem be sorted out > > > by kernel command-line parameter? In the case of locality we want to > > > keep regular "chain of trust" i.e. boot-loader makes the decision, > > > *even* in the case of DRTM. I would call this almost as constraint > > > that would be wise to set. > > > > > > > Please don't add a kernel command line parameter for this - the code > > running in the decompressor will be the one setting it and there are > > better ways to pass information between these components (and the > > slaunch stack is already doing that in any case) > > Not sure if I follow this (I don't know what "decompressor" is). Right you refer to the process running GETSEC[SENTER], sorry, in the page with this detail. BR, Jarkko
