On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote: > On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: >>> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to use >>> SHA-256-only". That implies that you do not, in fact, prefer SHA-256 only. Is >>> that the case? Sure, maybe there are situations where you *have* to use SHA-1, >>> but why would you not at least *prefer* SHA-256? >> >> Yes. Please prefer to use SHA-256. >> >> Have you considered implementing I think it is SHA1-DC (as git has) that >> is compatible with SHA1 but blocks the known class of attacks where >> sha1 is actively broken at this point? > > We are using the kernel's implementation, addressing what the kernel > provides is beyond our efforts. Perhaps someone who is interested in > improving the kernel's SHA1 could submit a patch implementing/replacing > it with SHA1-DC, as I am sure the maintainers would welcome the help. Well, someone who is interested to get his "secure" code merged should have a vested interested to have a non-broken SHA1 implementation if there is a sensible requirement to use SHA1 in that new "secure" code, no? Just for the record. The related maintainers can rightfully decide to reject known broken "secure" code on a purely technical argument. Thanks, tglx