On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 08:44:21AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 30.09.2022 01:02, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> > Memory of type EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY, EFI_LOADER_CODE, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE, and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA may be clobbered by
> > Xen before Linux gets to start using it. Therefore, Linux under Xen
> > must not use EFI tables from such memory. Most of the remaining EFI
> > memory types are not suitable for EFI tables, leaving only
> > EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY, EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA, and
> > EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE. When running under Xen, Linux should only
> > use tables that are located in one of these types of memory.
> >
> > This patch ensures this, and also adds a function
> > (xen_config_table_memory_region_max()) that will be used later to
> > replace the usage of the EFI memory map in esrt.c when running under
> > Xen. This function can also be used in mokvar-table.c and efi-bgrt.c,
> > but I have not implemented this.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> In Xen we don't clobber EfiBootServices{Code,Data} when xen.efi was passed
> "-mapbs". Should we perhaps extend the interface such that Dom0 can then
> also use tables located in such regions, perhaps by faking
> EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME in the attributes returned by XEN_FW_EFI_MEM_INFO?
I can add a check for EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME, but only if I can require a Xen
version with https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/cc0fbcb4-5ea3-178c-e691-9acb7cc9a3a7@xxxxxxxx/t/#u.
This is easy in Qubes OS via RPM dependencies, but I am not sure if it
is suitable for upstream without a mechanism for dom0 to verify that the
patch has been included.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab
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