> On Jan 11, 2022, at 11:16 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, 2022-01-10 at 23:25 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote: >>> Jarkko, my concern is that once this version of the patch set is >>> upstreamed, would limiting which keys may be loaded onto the .machine >>> keyring be considered a regression? >> >> >> Currently certificates built into the kernel do not have a CA restriction on them. >> IMA will trust anything in this keyring even if the CA bit is not set. While it would >> be advisable for a kernel to be built with a CA, nothing currently enforces it. >> >> My thinking for the dropped CA restriction patches was to introduce a new Kconfig. >> This Kconfig would do the CA enforcement on the machine keyring. However if the >> Kconfig option was not set for enforcement, it would work as it does in this series, >> plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys. This would be done by removing >> the restriction placed in this patch. Let me know your thoughts on whether this would >> be an appropriate solution. I believe this would get around what you are identifying as >> a possible regression. > > True the problem currently exists with the builtin keys, but there's a > major difference between trusting the builtin keys and those being > loading via MOK. This is an integrity gap that needs to be closed and > shouldn't be expanded to keys on the .machine keyring. > > "plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys" is unacceptable. Ok, I’ll leave that part out. Could you clarify the wording I should include in the future cover letter, which adds IMA support, on why it is unacceptable for the end-user to make this decision?
