If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However, if
it's not called after that initial 64-byte push, it won't additionally
mix any bytes into the entropy pool. So it's conceivable that
crng_init==1 when later crng_initialize_primary() is called, but the
entropy pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will then
be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's
bad.
In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call
crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later
crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing.
In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty
pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted
bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 020443e34603..3499f6762ac1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -2298,6 +2298,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
+ mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, ret);
count -= ret;
buffer += ret;
if (!count || crng_init == 0)
--
2.34.1
