On 14/10/2021 16:36, Greg KH wrote: > On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 01:08:47PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote: >> When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco) >> secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel. >> >> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + >> drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- >> drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++ >> include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++ >> 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> index 147c30a81f15..35e082e5f603 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { >> #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS >> &efi.mokvar_table, >> #endif >> + &efi.coco_secret, > > Shouldn't this depend on CONFIG_EFI_SECRET? > > Why build all of this code if that option is not enabled? > Thanks Greg for noticing this. Fixed in v4 [1] where the code is guarded with #ifdefs (so it's not built by default). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/ -Dov