On Fri, 2021-05-21 at 10:56 -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: [...] > In case of the SEV-SNP and TDX, the guest OS participates during the > attestation flow; the driver working on the behalf of userspace and > does not have access to the secret, so it cannot populate the file > with the secrets in it. OK, so for a simple encrypted VM using root on luks, how in SNP does the boot loader obtain the disk passphrase? In the non SNP case, it's already upstream: OVMF finds the secret page and converts it to an EFI config table, which is passed into grub. It's starting to sound like we'll need a new grub module for SNP which will do an active attestation and receive the passphrase over some channel secure against the cloud provider. Could you give us an example of how you think this flow will work? Thanks, James
