On Fri, 28 Feb 2020 at 10:43, David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 28.02.20 10:39, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Fri, 28 Feb 2020 at 10:35, David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 28.02.20 10:31, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >>> On 28.02.20 10:19, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >>>> On 17.02.20 12:39, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
> >>>>> If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
> >>>>> from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
> >>>>> if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
> >>>>> not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
> >>>>> is used.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
> >>>>> EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
> >>>>> the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> >>>>> [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
> >>>>> [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> >>>>> [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>>>> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>>>
> >>>> This patch seems to break a very basic x86-64 QEMU setup (booting
> >>>> upstream kernel with a F31 initrd - are you running basic boot tests?).
> >>>> Luckily, it only took me 5 minutes to identify this patch. Reverting
> >>>> this patch from linux-next fixes it for me.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> [ 1.042766] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 6625d6e34255935276d2c9851e2458909a4bcd69'
> >>>> [ 1.044314] zswap: loaded using pool lzo/zbud
> >>>> [ 1.045663] Key type ._fscrypt registered
> >>>> [ 1.046154] Key type .fscrypt registered
> >>>> [ 1.046524] Key type fscrypt-provisioning registered
> >>>> [ 1.051178] Key type big_key registered
> >>>> [ 1.055108] Key type encrypted registered
> >>>> [ 1.055513] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
> >>>> [ 1.056172] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
> >>>> [ 1.056706] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
> >>>> [ 1.057367] PGD 0 P4D 0
> >>>> [ 1.057729] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> >>>> [ 1.058249] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-next-20200228+ #79
> >>>> [ 1.059167] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.4
> >>>> [ 1.060230] RIP: 0010:0x0
> >>>> [ 1.060478] Code: Bad RIP value.
> >>>> [ 1.060786] RSP: 0018:ffffbc7880637d98 EFLAGS: 00010246
> >>>> [ 1.061281] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffbc7880637dc8
> >>>> [ 1.061954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffbc7880637df0 RDI: ffffffffa73c40be
> >>>> [ 1.062611] RBP: ffffbc7880637e20 R08: ffffbc7880637dac R09: ffffa0238f4ba6c0
> >>>> [ 1.063278] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
> >>>> [ 1.063956] R13: ffffa024bdd6f660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> >>>> [ 1.064609] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa023fdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> >>>> [ 1.065360] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> >>>> [ 1.065900] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000b1610000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> >>>> [ 1.066562] Call Trace:
> >>>> [ 1.066803] load_uefi_certs+0xc8/0x2bb
> >>>> [ 1.067171] ? get_cert_list+0xfb/0xfb
> >>>> [ 1.067523] do_one_initcall+0x5d/0x2f0
> >>>> [ 1.067894] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80
> >>>> [ 1.068337] kernel_init_freeable+0x243/0x2c2
> >>>> [ 1.068751] ? rest_init+0x23a/0x23a
> >>>> [ 1.069095] kernel_init+0xa/0x106
> >>>> [ 1.069416] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
> >>>> [ 1.069759] Modules linked in:
> >>>> [ 1.070050] CR2: 0000000000000000
> >>>> [ 1.070361] ---[ end trace fcce9bb4feb21d99 ]---
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Sorry, wrong mail identified, the patch is actually
> >>>
> >>> commit 6b75d54d5258ccd655387a00bbe1b00f92f4d965
> >>> Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>> Date: Sun Feb 16 19:46:25 2020 +0100
> >>>
> >>> integrity: Check properly whether EFI GetVariable() is available
> >>>
> >>> Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not
> >>>
> >>> which made it work. (not even able to find that patch on lkml ...)
> >>
> >> To clarify for Ard, your patch breaks a basic QEMU setup (see above,
> >> NULL pointer dereference). Reverting your patch from linux-next makes it
> >> work again.
> >>
> >
> > Does this fix it?
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > index 41269a95ff85..d1746a579c99 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > @@ -300,12 +300,12 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void)
> > {
> > int error;
> >
> > - if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
> > - return 0;
> > -
> > if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
> > efi.runtime_supported_mask = 0;
> >
> > + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > if (efi.runtime_supported_mask) {
> > /*
> > * Since we process only one efi_runtime_service() at a time, an
> >
>
> Yes, does the trick!
>
Thanks, David. I'll get this out and into -next asap.
