On 2/7/20 9:12 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On Fri, 7 Feb 2020 at 00:58, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx> wrote:
On 2/7/20 1:21 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On Fri, 7 Feb 2020 at 00:01, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx> wrote:
On 2/6/20 11:35 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On Thu, 6 Feb 2020 at 18:26, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx> wrote:
...
Please, indicate which software you expect to expose the initrd related
EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL.
The primary use case is GRUB and other intermediate loaders, since it
would remove any need for these components to know any such details.
My aim is to make the next architecture that gets added to GRUB for
EFI boot 100% generic.
Using an UEFI variable for passing the initrd device path would be a
leaner solution on the bootloader side than requiring an extra
EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL implementation.
This would also require kernel changes, since we don't currently load
initrds from arbitrary device paths. The EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL is much
more complicated than needed, and it doesn't work well with mixed
mode. It also requires GRUB to expose the filesystem it loads the
initrd from via EFI protocols, which is currently unnecessary and
therefore not implemented.
This means you move the complexity of EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL from Linux to GRUB.
No. I am not interested in EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL, only in LoadFile2, which
is a single method that needs to be implemented.
I said you move complexity because GRUB will need to use the
EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL to do the job that you do not want to do in Linux.
I would not have a problem if this would only touch GRUB. But if listen
to Ilias we are replacing one implementation in Linux by one in GRUB and
one in U-Boot and one in EDK2 and one in any other firmware.
If u-boot will be used to boot RISC-V in EFI mode without GRUB, then I
expect that we will need an implementation of this in u-boot.
What sets RISC-V apart? GRUB for RISC-V is available.
>>
RISC-V EFI boot is not supported yet in upstream Linux.
It is currently prepared Atish Patra of WDC.
Also, using an EFI variable defeats the purpose. The whole point of
this is making it more likely that the kernel loaded the initrd that
the bootloader or firmware intended it to load, and having a piece of
simple [signed] code that implements this is the easiest way to
achieve that.
At least on my Debian system it is the operating system creating initrd
and defining which initrd matches which kernel. GRUB simply assumes that
files ending on the same version number match. Therefore I would say
Linux hopes that GRUB loads what Linux intended.
The chain of trust would not be broken if the kernel were responsible
for loading the initrd and for checking if it matches the kernel. Linux
already does this for the kernel modules in initrd.
We can still sign the initrd and Linux can verify the signature. What
I am after is an interface that does not require the initrd to
originate from a EFI file system protocol, and which doesn't require
the loaded initrd to sit in memory for an unspecified amount of time
and its information passed via DT properties or bootparams structs.
So invoking EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL directly is not going to work,
regardless of whether we get the devicepath from the command line or
from a EFI variable.
What do you mean by "is not going to work"?
With the device path you can find the handle implementing the
EFI_SIMPLE_FIL_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL.
For u-boot, it should be trivial to implement a simple LoadFile2
protocol wrapper around EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL that can be installed on a
handle that also carries EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL.
A U-Boot implementation of the EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL would need a
device path variable to find the block device and to open the
EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL before accessing the file.
Linux would not be needing more lines and we would not repeat the same
code in GRUB, U-Boot, EDK2, etc.
As said Linux updates the initrd often. If that file is not signed by
Linux in a well defined way, do not expect any security at all.
It is not only about security. The primary goal is to remove the need
for arch specific knowledge in the firmware about DT, bootparams and
initrd allocation policies without being forced to load the initrd
from a filesystem that is exposed via a EFI protocol.
Where are device-trees touched by this patch?
When booting via UEFI there is no need for knowledge of initrd
allocation policies in U-Boot because up to now Linux or GRUB or iPXE
load initrd.
Furthermore I need no knowledge of bootparams in U-Boot once we properly
we support UEFI variables at runtime because grub-update will pass the
command line in one of the Bootxxxx UEFI variables.
But most importantly I do not have to implement anything Linux specific
in U-Boot for booting via UEFI up to now.
Adding Linux specific stuff to u-boot is arguably more appropriate
than adding architecture specific stuff to EFI loaders that could
otherwise be entirely generic.
...
Your patch claims to fend off a specific threat scenario: A user puts an
untrusted initrd on the disk and references it in the Linux command line.
If he is able to do so with your current bootloader (signed or not
signed), he most probably will also be able to delete a good initrd from
the filesystem and thus force your code into the unsafe path.
That is why I say that with the current fallback logic this patch
achieves no increase in security. Of cause you could remove the fallback
logic. But in this case your Linux will not boot with any legacy
bootloader or firmware.
If there is a better way to expose the initrd that
a) does not require the initrd to reside on a file system that is
accessible via EFI protocols, and
b) does not require the loader to know about arch specific policies
regarding the placement of the initrd in memory, and
c) does not leave a time window between the time that the initrd is
loaded/verified/measured by the firmware and the time that the kernel
gets handed the buffer
then I am happy to discuss it. This proposal is the best I could come
up with to achieve the above.
Hello Ard,
I think part of our different views is that we are thinking about two
different use cases which both have their relevance:
If I understand you correctly, you are thinking about an embedded device
where the kernel and the initrd is essentially part of the firmware
provided by the device.
I am thinking of a system running a standard Linux distribution like
Debian where the initrd is generated by the operating system
In both use cases verifying the initrd is of importance.
Now concerning the requirements:
a) In U-Boot all file systems on block devices can be made accessible
via EFI protocols. Are you thinking about initrds that are not in a file
system?
b) My suggestion to use a UEFI variable for communicating the device
path would not require any arch specific policies either.
c) I proposed that the kernel does the verification. So there would be
equally nothing in between loading the file and its verification. Yet
responsibilities would be changed.
But possibly I missed some requirements you have in mind that I should
consider.
Best regards
Heinrich
