Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: disable file loading and page deallocation in mixed mode

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On Fri, 13 Dec 2019 at 20:56, Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 12/13/19 7:49 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Fri, 13 Dec 2019 at 13:29, Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> On 13-12-2019 10:11, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >>> EFI mixed mode is a nice hack, since it allows us to run 64-bit Linux
> >>> on low end x86_64 machines that shipped with 32-bit UEFI as they were
> >>> built to run 32-bit Windows only.
> >>>
> >>> Mixed mode relies on the ability to convert calls made using the
> >>> 64-bit calling convention into calls using the 32-bit one. This
> >>> involves pushing a 32-bit word onto the stack for each argument
> >>> passed in a 64-bit register, relying on the fact that all quantities
> >>> that are the native size or smaller (including pointers) can be safely
> >>> truncated to 32 bits. (In the pointer case, we rely on the fact that
> >>> we are still executing in the firmware context, which uses a 1:1
> >>> mapping that can only access the lower 4 GB of the address space)
> >>>
> >>> For types that are explicitly 64 bits wide, such as EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS
> >>> or UINT64, this assumption doesn't hold. The correct way to marshall
> >>> such a call would be to push two consecutive 32-bit words onto the
> >>> stack, but given that the naive thunking code has no knowledge
> >>> whatsoever of the prototype of the function it is invoking, all we can
> >>> do is avoid calling such functions altogether.
> >>>
> >>> The FreePages() boot service is affected by this, so we should not call
> >>> that at all in mixed mode. In practice, this doesn't change much, since
> >>> in the past, these calls would have been made with a bogus address, and
> >>> so we were leaking this memory already. Note that the scope of this leak
> >>> is the EFI execution context only, so it makes no difference for Linux.
> >>>
> >>> The other piece of functionality that we need to disable is loading files
> >>> passed via file=xxxx on the command line, given that the Open() method
> >>> takes two UINT64s as well.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> Just ignoring the file= arguments is fine with me, as you say this has
> >> been broken on mixed-mode since forever so likely no-one is using it:
> >>
> >> Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > Do you have any recommendations on how to test this? Are you using GRUB to boot?
> >
> > I am trying to test the random.c failure using QEMU+OVMF, which
> > implements the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on top of virtio-rng-pci, but I cannot
> > reproduce the failure.
>
> I hit the random.c issue when testing a 5.5-rc1 x86_64 kernel on a Bay Trail
> tablet. Almost any Bay Trail hw will come with 32 bit uefi because when Bay
> Trail tablets (and 2-in-1s) first hit the market the 64 bit Windows drivers
> were not ready yet and running 32 bit Windows requires a 32 bit UEFI
> (Bay Trail devices do not have a classic bios mode / CSM).
>
> A popular model example machine of such a setup is The Asus T100TA 2-in-1.
>
> I'm using a standard Fedora install on these machines which goes:
> UEFI -> 32-bit-secureboot-shim -> 32-bit-uefi-grub -> 64 bit kernel
>

And after applying the fix, do you now get a RNG=0x.... on the line
that has ACPI, SMBIOS etc?



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