On 11/5/2019 12:24 AM, Eric Richter wrote:
From: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot
the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by
OPAL.
This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure
variables based on the unique key.
I feel splitting this patch into smaller set of changes would make it
easier to review. For instance roughly as below:
1, opal-api.h which adds the #defines OPAL_SECVAR_ and the API signature.
2, secvar.h then adds secvar_operations struct
3, powerpc/kernel for the Interface definitions
4, powernv/opal-secvar.c for the API implementations
5, powernv/opal-call.c for the API calls
6, powernv/opal.c for the secvar init calls.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
index 378e3997845a..c1f25a760eb1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
@@ -211,7 +211,10 @@
#define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173
#define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174
#define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175
-#define OPAL_LAST 175
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178
+#define OPAL_LAST 178
Please fix the indentation for the #defines
+static int opal_get_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize,
+ u8 *data, uint64_t *dsize)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!key || !dsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *dsize = cpu_to_be64(*dsize);
+
+ rc = opal_secvar_get(key, ksize, data, dsize);
+
+ *dsize = be64_to_cpu(*dsize);
Should the return status (rc) from opal_secvar_get be checked before
attempting to do the conversion (be64_to_cpu)?
+static int opal_get_next_variable(const char *key, uint64_t *keylen,
+ uint64_t keybufsize)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!key || !keylen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *keylen = cpu_to_be64(*keylen);
+
+ rc = opal_secvar_get_next(key, keylen, keybufsize);
+
+ *keylen = be64_to_cpu(*keylen);
Same comment as above - should rc be checke before attempting to convert?
+
+ return opal_status_to_err(rc);
+}
+
+static int opal_set_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, u8 *data,
+ uint64_t dsize)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!key || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
Is the key and data received here from a trusted caller? If not, should
there be some validation checks done here before enqueuing the data?
-lakshmi
