On Sat, 2019-10-26 at 19:52 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-10-25 at 12:02 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote:
> > On 10/24/19 12:35 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> > > On 10/23/2019 8:47 PM, Nayna Jain wrote:
> > >
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
> > >> + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
> > >> + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good
> > >> signature
> > >> + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature.
> > >> + *
> > >> + * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible,
> > >> the IMA
> > >> + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if
> > >> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> > >> + * is not enabled.
> > >> + */
> > >> +static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
> > >> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> > >> +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> > >> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> > >> +#endif
> > >> + NULL
> > >> +};
> > >
> > > Is there any way to not use conditional compilation in the above array
> > > definition? Maybe define different functions to get "secure_rules" for
> > > when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is defined and when it is not defined.
> >
> > How will you decide which function to be called ?
>
> You could call "is_module_sig_enforced()".
Calling is_module_sig_enforce() would prevent verifying the same
kernel module appended signature twice, when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is
enabled, but not CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE. This comes at the expense
of having to define additional policies.
Unlike for the kernel image, there is no coordination between lockdown
and IMA for kernel modules signature verification. I suggest
deferring defining additional policies to when the lockdown/IMA
coordination is addressed.
Mimi
