RE: [PATCH] efi: fix out-of-bounds null overwrite vulnerability

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



>> What about using:
>> 
>> 	msg[len] = '\0';
>> 
>> to guarantee NUL termination?
>
> But that may leave garbage bytes in 'rcd_decode_str' in the case where
> the string isn't as long as 'len'.
>
> How about memset()'ing the buffer to zero and deleting the NUL
> termination line?

Looks like overkill to me.  We only use this function in two places:

        if (cper_dimm_err_location(cmem, rcd_decode_str))
                trace_seq_printf(p, "%s", rcd_decode_str);

        if (cper_dimm_err_location(&cmem, rcd_decode_str))
                printk("%s%s\n", pfx, rcd_decode_str);

Neither would care if there were garbage after the NUL and before the
end of the rcd_decode_str[] array.

This buffer isn't visible to user space, so we aren't leaking data by having
garbage bytes after the NUL.

-Tony
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html



[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Security]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [ECOS]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]

  Powered by Linux