On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 22:31 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> On Fri, 14 Mar 2014 22:15:45 +0000
> Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > The general problem includes having to support this even without an
> > selinux policy.
>
> Yes. No dispute about that. But equally the general solution should allow
> for it.
Well, sure. The current implementation doesn't conflict with selinux in
any way.
> > some other way. ChromeOS will load unmeasured kernel modules provided it
> > can attest to the trustworthyness of the filesystem containing them.
>
> See "How to Bypass Verified Boot Security in Chromium OS" 8)
>
> And it attests the trustworthiness of the filesystem by measuring it. If
> you have a measurement of object X that states it is unchanged then you
> have a valid measurement of any subset of object X for which the same
> assertion is proven. In this case since you know all the bits in the root
> fs are as before, so you know all the bits in the module are as before
You may attest to the trustworthiness of a filesystem by measuring it,
but you may also attest to it via some other means - for instance, it's
read-only and stored on media that requires physical presence to
modify.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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