On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 21:58 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> On Fri, 14 Mar 2014 19:24:55 +0000
> Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > As an example, imagine a platform with the bootloader and kernel on
> > read-only media. The platform can assert that the kernel is trusted even
> > if there's no measurement of the kernel.
>
> Only if you have a secure signed path through the controller firmware and
> physical security of the hardware. If not I can reprogram your BIOS, your
> GPU firmware, your USB stick or your CD-ROM controller to lie.
Sure, and then the trust that the firmware placed in the kernel would be
misplaced. You can subvert Secure Boot with an SPI flasher, just as you
can subvert selinux with a firewire dongle. Those attacks are outside
the threat model. If you're in a situation where you have to care about
threats outside that threat model then you need to choose a more
appropriate solution.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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