Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

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On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 08:54 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> All the more reason to ignore command line at this point. For Chrome
> OS, it's part of our boot state, so we don't care about it. For
> generic Secure Boot, we can add checks for dangerous stuff as we go
> forward. That's why I like this interface -- we can add to it as we
> identify bad stuff, and it stay separate from other semantics.

Sure, it's just another reason not to want to use a capability-based
interface - not all the policy we want to impose is related to
processes, so capabilities really don't make sense. The current patchset
adds a restriction to the acpi_rsdp argument, and I've no objection to
adding one to limit the use of mem=.

-- 
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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