Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages

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On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 12:03:31PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:

> If it is possible to do it in a fairly hypervisor-independent manner,
> I'm all for it.  That is, only by looking at AMD-specified CPUID leaves
> and at kernel ELF sections.

Not even that.

What that needs to be able to do is:

	kvm_map_percpu_hv_shared(st, sizeof(*st)))

where st is the percpu steal time ptr:

	struct kvm_steal_time *st = &per_cpu(steal_time, cpu);

Underneath, what it does basically is it clears the encryption mask from
the pte, see patch 16/32.

And I keep talking about SEV-ES because this is going to expand on the
need of having a shared memory region which the hypervisor and the guest
needs to access, thus unencrypted. See

http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/Protecting%20VM%20Register%20State%20with%20SEV-ES.pdf

This is where you come in and say what would be the best approach there...

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
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