On Tue, 3 Jan 2017, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Dec 20, 2016 at 9:29 AM, Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, 2016-12-16 at 17:00 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >> Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making > > sure they're using designated initializers. > > > > About the designated initializer patches, > > which by themselves are fine of course, > > and the fundamental randomization plugin, > > c guarantees that struct member ordering > > is as specified. > > > > how is the code to be verified so that > > any use of things like offsetof and any > > address/indexing is not impacted? > > AIUI, offsetof() works correctly in the face of this plugin, since the > ordering happens before the pass that handles offsetof(). Anything > that _does not_ use offsetof(), however, needs fixing. Based on the > work done in grsecurity, I don't see any added offsetof() uses that > are specific to the randomization plugin. > > (Note that the randomization plugin is only on function pointer > structures, where using an offsetof() should be rare to none, and on > hand-selected structures, where missing offsetof() should be easy to > audit.) What is the precise definition of "function pointer structures"? Only function pointers? At least one function pointer? thanks, julia _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/driverdev-devel
